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o, Jntrodugtion 
In this paper, I describe a class of models, called 
Artificial Worlds (AWs), that are designed to give insight 
into a process called emergent hierarchical organization 
(EHO). I argue that many economic phenomena seem to manifest 
EHO, and so economists might be interested in studying this 
process -- and in making use of AWs to do so. There are, 
however, some formidable inferential difficulties that will 
have to be overcome before AWs can become socially acceptable 
research tools. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly 
describes EHO. Section 2 introduces AWs and some of their 
attendant inferential.problems. Section 3 introduces two 
abstract AWs that address important general problems in EHO 
and then briefly describes an economic phenomenon, the coming 
into being of new industries, in which these problems appear 
to play a key -role. Section 4 describes a particular kind of 
AW, classifier systems, that can be used to represent agents 
that are capable of generating complex behaviors in response 
to intermittent rewards from an "environment" of which they 
are a part. A collection of such agents, engaging in 
"economic" interactions with one another, produces another 
kind of AW, in which such interesting aggregate behaviors as 
the formation of bubbles and crashes and technical trading in 
an artificial "stock market", may arise. Section 5 considers 
the idea of an Artificial Economy -- an AW that can provide a 
dynamic, nonequilibrium, microfounded account of such 
aggregate-level or macroeconomic phenomena as stable growth 
paths, business cycles, and Pareto firm-size distributions. 
1 Emergent Hierarghigal organization 
Many systems, in chemistry and biology as well as in human 
society, appear to have the capability of achieving, over 
time, a more and more complex organization. The process 
through which this organization is achieved, emergent 
hierarchical organization, typically displays two 
characteristic features. 
First, the organization is hierarchical. That is, the 
systems are composed of a number of different levels, each 
level consisting of entities that interact with one another. 
Lower-level entities may-actually be components of higher-
level ones. The higher in the hierarchy is the level, the 
longer is the time-scale and the more extended the space-
scale in which it is natural to describe the interactions 
between the relevant entities. For example, 
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• biological systems include entities and processes at 
levels ranging from molecular to cellular to organismic to 
ecologic; 
• economic activities involve interactions between 
individual "decision-makers", firms and households, 
industries, and national economies. 
Second, the systems appear to produce their own order. The 
actions of lower-level entities are channelled -- in effect, 
coordinated -- by higher-level structures that themselves 
arise from the lower-level entities' interactions. For 
example, 
• informal trading networks transform into formally 
organized impersonal markets; 
• neurons firing in response to sensory stimuli or the 
firing or other neurons with which they are connected produce 
predictable organism-level behavioral responses to particular 
patterns of environmental activity -- or may even give rise 
to action-guiding "concepts". 
The order induced by this kind of hierarchical coordination 
is never static, since the interactions between higher-level 
entities change the environment in which lower-level 
interactions take place, and hence in the higher-level 
structures that develop out of them. Thus, the system as a 
whole is characterized by perpetual novelty at all its 
levels. 
2 What are Artificial wor1ds and What Might we 
Learn from Them? 
Artificial Worlds are computer-implementable stochastic 
models, which consist of a set of "microlevel entities" that 
interact with each other and an "environment" in prescribed 
ways. AWs are designed so that they themselves may, under 
some conditions, manifest EHO. As a result, AWs represent an 
engineering approach to the study of EHO. 
The entities built into an AW and their modes of 
interaction may be quite abstract, or they may be closely 
linked to objects and relations occurring in some real-world 
system of interest. In the former case, the AW may be used 
to _investigate general principles underlying EHO, while in 
the latter the AWs may help us to understand how particular 
aggregate properties of the modelled real-world system depend 
on the characteristics of the lower-level processes that 
underlie them. 
Formally, an AW consists of a set of rnicroleyel entities 
(MEs), an environment and a dynamic. Each ME has attributes 
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and modes of interactions with other MEs. The environment 
has a state. 
When two or more MEs interact, their attributes may change. 
The changes are determined by the MEs' interaction modes. In 
addition, they may depend on the MEs' current attributes and 
the current state of the environment. Interactions between 
MEs can also change the state of the environment. 
The dynamic, which may be in part stochastic, specifies the 
order in which interactions occur. The dynamic also imposes 
rules that determine when MEs die and when new ones come into 
the World (and with what attributes). 
The initial conditions of an AW determine a state of the 
World: the state of the environment, a population of MEs, and 
the attributes of each of the MEs. These initial conditions, 
together with the dynamic of the AW, generate a history --
that is, a time-ordered sequence of states of the World. 
(With a stochastic dynamic, of course, the same initial 
conditions generate a probability distribution over a space 
of possible histories.) 
The aim of AW modelling is to discover whether (and under 
what conditions) histories exhibit interesting emergent 
properties. An emergent property is a feature of a history 
that (i) can be described in terms of aggregate-level 
constructs, without reference to the attributes of specific 
MEs; (ii) persists for time periods much greater than the 
time scale appropriate for describing the underlying micro-
interactions; and (iii) defies explanation by reduction to 
the superposition of "built in" micro-properties of the Aw.1 
For example, imagine an Artificial Economy in which MEs 
represent traders exchanging a set of commodities according 
to some prescribed rules that do not single out any 
particular commodity as a medium of exchange: the 
replacement of a barter system with the exclusive use of one 
of the commodities as a "money" would be an emergent property 
(see Section 4.5 below). Similarly, in an Artificial Economy 
in which some MEs•produce machines for sale to other MEs who 
in turn produce consumer goods for sale to other MEs (who 
work for one or the other producer MEs), the evolution of a 
stable growth rate for "GDP", or of sector-specific Pareto-
1 Obviously, what "defies ~xplanation" to one person may be explicable 
by another. What is required here is a negative assertion by the 
modeller, to the effect that the aggregate-level property in question is 
not deducible from the model's micro-properties by any argument 
substantially shorter than producing that property by running the model. 
I will discuss later some maneuvers that might lend "public" credibility 
to such an assertion. Notice that the modeller's assertion is not 
equivalent to the statement that he assigns low a priori probability to 
the property manifesting itself when he runs the model: after all, he 
may have other reasons than deductive argument for believing that 
systems with the micro-properties he built in to his model tend to 
exhibit aggregate-level regularities analogous to the property in 
question! 
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distributions for firm size, might be an emergent property 
(Section 5). 
As these examples indicate, some emergent properties can be 
described in terms of variables that aggregate over the 
attributes of many MEs (like GDP), while others refer to 
"real" higher-level structures (like money). Both give 
evidence of self-organization in the AW -- coordination among 
the MEs induced by their interactions, leading to system 
meta-stability. More is possible: higher-level "entities" 
may arise. These entities are composed of sets of MEs that 
display coordinated patterns of behavior. They may even 
reproduce themselves (Section 3.2) and develop modes of 
interaction between one another (Sections 3.1 and 4.4), 
leading to even higher-level emergent properties. In such 
cases, the AW exemplifies EHO. 
What can we hope to learn from AWs? We have to begin by 
considering "about wha:t" we can learn. First, the AW itself 
might be the primary target of inference, and we might want 
to discover just which emergent properties it manifests, and 
how they depend on the system rules and initial conditions. 
Second, the AW might be regarded as a model of some real-
world phenomenon in which we might be interested. In this 
case, we might want to determine whether (and if so, how) 
certain "lower"-level interactions in the real-world "cause" 
higher-level structures and processes to arise -- and how 
these higher-level structures and processes then change the 
nature of the lower-level interactions. Third, we might want 
to learn about EHO as an abstract phenomenon, investigating 
such questions as the following: 
• What properties must a system have for EHO to occur?2 
• Is there a taxonomy of possible forms of emergent 
organization? In particular, are all emergent organizational 
forms hierarchical? 
• How do the properties of emergent higher-level entities 
and their interactions depend on the properties of the lower-
level entities from which they arise? 
• What kinds of interactions are possible between the 
levels of a hierarchically organized system? In particular, 
how autonomous are the processes of different levels? Under 
what circumstances can the evolution of a system process be 
predicted on the basis of observations only of the attributes 
of entities at the same level as the process (that is, 
without detailed information about processes at lower or 
higher levels)? 
2 See Kauffman (1990) and Rasmussen et al. (1990) for some interesting 
speculation on this question. 
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• What are the dynamical properties of emergent processes? 
For example, are "punctuated equilibria" (Section 3.2) 
generic? 
While computer scientists might be interested in an AW for 
its own sake, economists presumably would study AWs in order 
to get insights into what might be going on in economies. 
Whatever the goal, to learn anything useful about any of the 
three inferential targets described above, we need strategies 
for designing appropriate AWs and for generating and 
processing useful data from them. There are some formidable 
difficulties standing in the way of this endeavor. I 
conclude this section by mentioning four of them. 
The need for computer-implementation 
AWs are well-defined mathematical models, but it is 
unlikely that interesting theorems about their emergent 
properties will be proved with tools currently available. I 
offer three reasons for this assessment: 
First, AWs are designed to be innovatory or open-ended 
systems. Their emergent properties are only meta-stable, not 
equilibria or asymptotic states. By changing the environment 
of the lower-level entities that give rise to them, emergent 
structures induce processes leading to their own 
transformation (or demise). As a result, it will be 
difficult to apply the rich repertoire of mathematical 
methods that compute equilibria or asymptotic states, and 
there is no corresponding methodology for studying the 
properties of transient phenomena. 
Second, emergent properties are necessarily complicated 
functions of the history of the attributes of the ME's from 
whose interactions they are formed (if this were not so, it 
would be easy to explain them by superposing the AW's micro-
properties, and they would not qualify as emergent 
properties!). Since the dynamics of AWs are specified in 
terms of these micro-interactions, it is hard to imagine that 
the mathematical description of emergent properties will be 
analytically tractable. 
Third, it seems to be a plausible (albeit ill-defined) 
hypothesis that the capability of a system to produce EHO is 
a function of its complexity, either in the attributes or 
arrangements of its component entities or in their patterns 
of interaction. As a result, the mathematician's ploy of 
constructing a highly simplified, tractable model that can be 
proved to display an interesting behavior observed in some 
more complicated system will not work in the context of EHO 
phenomena. 
Thus, it seems likely that we will learn about EHO from AWs 
only by implementing them computationally and observing what 
happens. As a result, we can learn about their emergent 
properties only inductively, and our success in that 
enterprise will depend on our ability to develop appropriate 
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statistical tools, for the design as well as for the analysis 
of "evolutionary" experiments. 
Identifying Emergent Properties 
The very nature of emergent properties makes it problematic 
for us, as observers of the AW, even to formulate them, let 
alone discover whether or not they in fact obtain. Emergent 
properties represent innovations in the organization of the 
AW, and, to describe them, a new vocabulary is required, 
beyond the modelling language used to express the attributes 
and interactions of the AW's micro-entities. After all, 
emergent properties cannot be compactly expressed in the 
modelling language itself -- and, by definition, they "defy 
explanation" in terms of the constructs of that language. So 
how do we develop the right aggregate-level language to 
define -- and guide our search for -- potentially emergent 
properties? 
AWs that model a real-world system have a natural 
vocabulary to express potentially emergent properties: the 
language that describes higher-level patterns and structures 
observed in the modelled system. Some3 of these higher-level 
constructs may suggest AW analogs that can be expressed as 
functions of AW histories, and the words that describe the 
real-world constructs may be appropriated to define these 
functions. Thus, the modeller can build a glossary that 
semantically links higher-level real-world constructs with 
particular functions of AW histories. Any real-world 
phenomenon that can be described by these constructs 
translates, via the glossary, to a candidate for an emergent 
property of the AW -- provided, that is, that it satisfies 
the metastability and "explanation-defying" definitional 
requirements. Candidates generated in this way might be 
described as "expected emergent properties" of the AW. 
"Unexpected emergence" -- an aggregate-level coordination 
phenomenon in the AW unmotivated by any real-world analogy 
is harder to find. This is particularly troublesome for 
abstract AWs, which lack a natural real-world reference 
vocabulary. In fact, most of the work that goes into 
studying such AW models as Coreworld (Rasmussen et al., 
1990), Tierra (Ray, 1992) and Function-Object Gas (Fontana, 
1992 -- see Section 3.1 below) consists in poring over 
output, attempting to identify features that display the 
"right" kind of coherence and temporal stability -- and then 
formulating a vocabulary, with both mathematical and "natural 
3 But certainly not all. After all, the modeller abstracts only a· 
small subset of entities, attributes and interactions to incorporate 
into the Artificial World, and only those higher~level constructs for 
which it is meaningful to aggregate only over this subset can be 
translated as a function on Artificial World histories. The 
determination of which higher-level constructs are meaningful in the 
Artificial World -- and how -- can be an important exercise for 
understanding the meaning and role of these constructs in the real world 
system itself. 
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language" variants, in which to express them. Whether this 
search can be in some way "automated" is an important 
conceptual and practical problem. 4 
Finding conditions of Emergence 
When potentially emergent properties have been identified 
and translated into the behaviors of appropriate functions on 
histories, the next question to ask is: under what initial 
conditions (and, for stochastic dynamics, with what 
probability) will they obtain? Developing strategies to 
answer this question is difficult, since the space of initial 
conditions typically has a very high dimension, and 
interesting emergent properties may well depend on 
complicated interdependencies among the system parameters 
that define these dimensions. 
Moreover, the relevant search space is even larger, because 
it has a time dimension. Well-defining the function on 
histories that determines whether a particular property 
emerges requires a specification of how long that property 
must persist -- and this specification must always be 
somewhat arbitrary. In addition, whether a particular 
property emerges or not depends not only on initial 
conditions, but on the length of time the history is observed 
-- so negative results may just mean that longer observation 
times are required, not that the initial conditions are 
insufficient to support the emergent property in question. 
causality and Emergence 
Suppose a potentially emergent property of an AW has been 
identified and defined in terms of some function of histories 
-- and, with some set of initial conditions, a history has 
been generated and the property obtained. What kind of claim 
can be made about what "caused" this property -- in 
particular, is it meaningful to think of emergence itself . .as. 
a cause? 
To interpret emergence as a cause, we mean to say that the 
property formed because of the interactions amongst a dense 
network of entities -- and this formation depended on the 
density of this network, and perhaps the richness of the 
4 Bedau and Packard (1992) propose a statistic whose purpose is to 
diagnose the arrival of an "innovation" into an Artificial World. Their 
statistic seems to depend on a genotype-phenotype distinction: the 
microentities in the World are replicators, whose behaviors are coded by 
a genome; selection operates on the coded behaviors; innovations in 
behavior depend on the introduction of a new genotype; and successful 
innovations are marked by the initiating genotype's ability to persist 
in the population over time. The Bedau and Packard statistic tracks 
such persistence at the genomic level. But the generality of this 
approach seems questionable: not all higher-level innovations depend 
upon the persistence of single micro-innovations, even in biological 
evolution. To paraphrase the evolutionary perspective persuasively set 
forth in Buss (1989): on an evolutionary time scale, genotypes are 
transient, while phenotypic organization is here to stay. 
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structure of the entities and their interactions. Thus, it 
is not enough merely to produce the property in the AW from 
some particular set of initial conditions: that set would 
have to be embedded in a hierarchy of sets, ordered by a 
"complexity" measure that increased with the network's 
density and the structural richness of the MEs and their 
interactions. Emergence as a cause would then require 
demonstration that the property fails to appear for low 
values of this measure -- but does, beyond some threshold 
value. 5 
Such a complexity measure imposes a structure on the high-
dimensional AW parameter space. Without this structure, it 
is hard to see how one could begin to infer about what causes 
emergent properties -- and it is equally hard to see how any 
causal inference could be made that is independent of the 
particular measure used to induce the structure. 
Now suppose we know. how to infer about emergence-as-cause 
inside the AW. Suppose further that we believe that a 
particular aggregate-level feature in the AW is indeed an 
emergent property, and we have determined how "complex" the 
AW needs to be in order to support the feature's emergence. 
Suppose in addition that this emergent property is 
semantically linked to some real-world higher-level pattern 
or structure: what can we infer about the "cause" of this 
feature in the real world? 
At the least, we can certainly argue against the necessity 
of any alternative explanation that assigns a causal role 
either to other real-world aggregate-level features that do 
not have analogs in the AW or to attributes of lower-level 
"agents" that are not possessed by the MEs of the AW. For 
example, an Artificial Economy in which, say, a stable 
growth path for GDP emerged from sufficiently rich patterns 
of micro-interactions would thus argue against the necessity 
of invoking the existence of Walrasian equilibrium to explain 
macro-coordination -- or against the proposition that such 
macro-coordination depended upon the assumption of optimizing 
agents capable of forming rational expectations. 
But we would like to infer more than this. Can we argue 
that the real-world aggregate regularity is indeed "caused 
by" the entities and interactions we abstracted out of it and 
built into the AW, in which the analog of that regularity was 
identified as an emergent property? That is, can we infer 
emergence as a "causal mechanism" in the real world, once we 
have so identified it in the AW? · 
5 One might suspect that typically, as the complexity measure increases 
above this value, a second threshold might be obtained, beyond which the 
system again fails to manifest the property in question -- just as 
turning up the heat applied to the bottom of a beaker of fluid results 
first in the formation of convection cells and, at even higher 
temperature, their degradation into a regime of turbulence. See 
Kauffman (1992) and Langton (1992) for stimulating discussions on this 
theme. 
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Certainly, the AW demonstration ought to raise our 
probability that such a mechanism operates in the real world, 
just as it diminishes the probability of alternative causal 
stories that credit features and attributes not detected or 
built into the AW. But the real world necessarily contains 
many more entities and interactions than the AW, operating at 
levels below, at and above that of the focal regularity. 
Surely, it is possible that the causal mechanism hinted at in 
the AW is swamped by the additional "turbulence" in the real 
world, and some entirely different sets of interactions or 
direct effects drive the formation of the feature of 
interest. It is not clear how to determine how plausible is 
this possibility -- but of course, the more specific one can 
be about just which additional interactions or effects might 
provide the alternative causal story, the more plausible it 
would appear to be. 
3 Abstract AWs and the Lawfulness gf ERO 
In this section, I describe two abstract Artificial Worlds, 
Walter Fontana's Function-Object Gas (Fontana, 1992) and 
Kristian Lindgren's Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma 
(Lindgren, 1992). Function-Object Gas is directed primarily 
to an exploration of the relation between structure and 
function, Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma to the dynamics of 
evolutionary processes. 
While much work remains to be done before AWs yield deep 
insight into these two themes, the themes themselves are 
fundamental to an understanding of many real-world processes. 
The section concludes with a discussion of an economic 
example of such a process, the coming into being of a new 
industry. 
3 1 Function-Object Gas; Function and organization 
Function-Object Gas (FOG) is designed to explore how 
higher-level structure emerges from micro-level function. 
The notion of function on which FOG is based is abstracted 
from chemistry. A chemical entity functions by acting on 
other chemical entities to produce new chemical entities. 
Similarly, in FOG, all interactions between MEs are of a 
single type: a ME A acts on a ME B to produce a new ME A(B) .6 
FOG also abstracts from chemistry the relation between 
structure and function at the micro-level. Which new 
entities are produced when chemical entities interact are 
completely determined by the structure of the interacting 
entities: the components from which they are built up and 
the way in which these components are arranged. Thus, a 
chemical entity is both a syntactic and a semantic object. 
Syntactically, it is built up from component objects, 
6 The interacting entities are ordered: A(B) need not be the same as 
B(A). In addition, A(B) is not defined for all MEs A and B. 
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according to well-defined rules. Semantically, its "meaning" 
(that is, its function), coded by its structure, is revealed 
in the chemical reactions in which it partakes. The dual 
character -- syntactic and semantic -- of chemical entities 
is most striking in catalysis: the syntactic form of the 
catalyst is unchanged, even as it accomplishes its function 
of transforming the structure of other chemical entities. 
In FOG, each ME has a syntactic representation in terms of 
more elementary components. This representation never 
changes during the lifetime of the ME. An ME's 
representation codes for its semantics, in that· the 
·representations of the interacting MEs determine the outcome 
of the interaction. That is, the representations of the MEs 
A(B) and B(A) can be "computed" from the representations of A 
and B, for every pair of allowable syntactic representations 
A and B. 718 In FOG, all interactions are doubly catalytic: 
neither A nor Bis "destroyed" by their interaction. So, A+B 
-> A+B+A(B). 
Thus, in chemistry and FOG alike, micro-level function is 
determined by micro-level structure. However, this is by no 
means the end of the function-structure story: micro-level 
function can in turn give rise to higher-level structures. 
Consider an autocatalytic network: a set of chemical 
entities that (perhaps in the presence of some "food set") 
catalyze reactions among its members (and the food set), such 
that each member of the network is a product of at least one 
of these reactions. Thus, an autocatalytic network 
reproduces itself -- collectively, not necessarily 
individually. Take away some of its members, and an 
autocatalytic network may "disappear" as one after another of 
its members fail to be produced by reactions involving 
remaining members; while the removal of others of its members 
may not matter, as they are soon replaced from 
transformations among the "survivors". Thus, even though the 
functionality of a particular chemical entity may be latent 
7 Technically, this is achieved by using Alonzo Church's A-calculus to 
represent MEs as A-objects -- mathematical functions in intensional 
form, that act on other functions to yield new functions according to 
nine axioms of construction and syntactic transformation. 
Computationally, then, a A-object is both function and data. The 
components of a A-object are variable names, the abstraction symbol A, 
and three structural symbols (period and left and right parentheses). 
The set of A-objects are defined recursively by the three construction 
axioms: variables are A-objects; if xis a variable and Man A-object, 
then u.M is a A-object; and if Mand N are A-objects, so is M(N). The 
semantics governing function evaluation are incorporated in the other 
five axioms. The A-calculus is computationally complete; every 
recursive function can be represented as a A-object. See Barendregt 
(1984) for details. 
8 For A-objects A and B, Bis not in the domain of A if the computation 
implied by the transformation axioms applied to A(B) does not halt. In 
FOG, there is a limit placed on transformation steps, and any 
interaction whose associated computation exceeds this limit produces no 
product. 
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in its structure, the organizations of chemical entities to 
which this functionality may give rise are really aggregate-
level or population concepts. 
To see how FOG can be used to address the problem of the 
emergence of higher-level structure from micro-level 
function, I first describe how to generate a FOG history. 
Start with a population of MEs 9 (A-objects: see footnote 7) 
-- these are typically generated at random. Next, select a 
pair of these MEs at random, say A and B, and let them 
interact as described above. If the computation for A(B) 
terminates, add this ME to the population and select another 
ME at random and remove it from the population. This dynamic 
keeps the population size constant. Now iterate the 
interaction-deletion steps many times. 10 
The population of MEs in the FOG after many interactions 
may display structure at the syntactic or the semantic level. 
Syntactic structure refers to common features of the 
representations of the members of a set of MEs. For example, 
the set of A-objects of the form Aij = Ax1 .Ax2 • ... Axi. xj, j< 
i, exhibits syntactic structure. 
Semantic structure depends on the production pathways 
involving reaction products from interactions between members 
of the set. For example, suppose A, B, C, and Dare MEs, 
with A(B) = C, B(C) = D, C(D) = A and D(A) = B. Then, 
regardless of the other interactions of these MEs, the set 
{A, B, c, D} is self-maintaining, in that each can be formed 
from interactions between members of the set. (This property 
is analogous to the concept of an autocatalytic network). 
Note also that {A,B}, {B,C}, {C,D} and {A,D} are all seeding 
.s.e.t..s., in that the entire set can be reconstructed by 
interactions involving the elements in each of these subsets 
and their "descendant" products. A set that contains all of 
the products from interactions between set members is closed. 
Closed self-maintaining sets are self-reproducing. 
Self-maintaining sets are not guaranteed to survive under 
FOG dynamics, since MEs are removed randomly from the 
population. Clearly, MEs that belong to a self-reproducing 
subset with several small seeding sets have a better chance 
of persisting in a population that contains that seeding set 
than does an ME that belongs to no such subset. One way in 
which a FOG population can display semantic structure is if 
it can be decomposed into a number of such self-reproducing 
subsets. These subsets in turn can have a variety of 
semantic structures, which may be represented by means of 
interaction graphs, as in Fontana (1992). 
So far, there have been no constraints imposed on 
interactions in FOG, except for the upper bound on allowable 
9 There is no (external) environment in FOG. 
10 Note that with this dynamic, FOG interactions are "on average" 
singly, not doubly, catalytic, since A is removed from the system with 
the same probability as it is selected to form a product A(C), for all c 
in the population. 
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computation time (see footnote 8). It turns out, however, 
that what higher-level structures form depends crucially on 
which interactions are allowed to take place. For example, 
some MEs may reproduce themselves (that is, A(A) = A) or 
other MEs (A(B) = B). Clearly, if the set of MEs reproduced 
by an ME A contains A, it is self-maintaining, in a trivial 
way. Fontana (1992) reports that, without constraints in 
interactions, FOG tends to organize around production 
pathways that end in an ME that reproduces every ME in the 
pathway. Starting with 1000 random MEs, after tens of 
thousands of collisions, the FOG population is typically 
closed and consists of one or more self-reproducing subsets, 
each with its own identity fu~ction. 
Thus, to explore a greater range of interesting emergent 
structures in FOG, Fontana has begun to investigate what 
happens when he c9nstrains the permissible set of 
interactions. He doe~ this in two ways, which correspond to 
syntactic and semantic constraints. For example, barring 
copy reactions is a semantic constraint, since whether a 
reaction copies one of the .reactants is a function of the 
interaction, not just the product of the reaction. In 
general, though, it is difficult to formulate semantic 
constraints. Syntactic constraints bar interactions that 
produce reaction products with specified structure. Thus, 
they amount to restricting the FOG population to particular 
subsets of A-objects. 
To determine which products to prohibit, Fontana has taken 
advantage of a peculiar finding: FOG tends to produce 
organization on ho.th the syntactic and semantic level. That 
is, when the FOG achieves a metastable, closed population, 
this population exhibits patterns both in the structure of 
their MEs and in their production pathways. Thus, it is 
possible to prevent a particular semantic organization from 
occurring by prohibiting reaction products that have its 
corresponding syntactic features. 
For example, when copy reactions are prohibited, families 
consisting of MEs of the form Aij = Ax1 .Ax2 • ••• Axi. xj, j< i, 
as described above, proliferate. Their syntactic structure 
is clear. Semantically, according to the transformation 
rules of A-calculus, these so-called projection functions 
satisfy 
Aij (Akm) = Ai-1, j-1 1 
= Ak+i-1,m+i-1 , 
if j > 1 
if j = 1 
Thus, start with, say, Ai1 : this ME acts on itself to 
produce A2i-l, i , which then acts on itself (or on any other 
member of the family) to produce (in turn) A2i-s,i-s , for s = 
2, ... , i-1. These i MEs form a simple semantic structure, 
organized around the cycle Au -> A2i-l, 1 ->~1- 2 , 1 _1 ••• -> Ail. 
Note that any member of this cycle is a seeding set for the 
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cycle. According to Fontana (personal communication, 1992), 
FOG without copy reactions organizes into one or more of 
these families, with transient random selection between 
families (and victory tends to go to the largest). 
So the next organizational question to investigate is: 
what structures emerge when all MEs of the form Aij are 
prohibited? Once these are discovered and their syntactic 
regularities are found, a further constraint can be imposed, 
and additional organization forms obtained. By continuing in 
this way, Fontana is uncovering a hierarchy of increasingly 
complex organizational forms that can emerge in FOG, under 
increasingly complex constraints on allowable interact~ons. 
He is attempting to associate with each of these forms an 
underlying algebraic structure that describes its interaction 
graph. The hope is that these structures will provide the 
basis for a mathematical theory of organizational form. 
Another direction of current research with FOG is to 
search for the emergence of structures at a higher level than 
the sets of MEs so far described. For example, can self-
reproducing sets interact with one another to produce other 
sets with some metastable structure? An interaction between 
sets of MEs can be defined trivially to produce the union of 
all the pairwise interactions between elements of the two 
sets. It is not clear that this is a useful definition; nor 
is it yet clear what a reasonable alternative might be. It 
may also be necessary to introduce noise into the system, for 
example by occasionally perturbing the structure of 
individual MEs or the products of their interactions. This 
may "destabilize" emergent organizations, especially those 
that involve many MEs with complicated production pathways, 
with the result that the system will support more, smaller 
structures that may support or inhibit one another through 
their mutual interactions. At any rate, EHO is so far a 
one-level phenomenon in FOG. 
To conclude this discussion of FOG, consider an alternative 
way of building a computational system in which entities 
interact with entities to produce new entities. An obvious 
strategy is to decide how many entities you want to have in 
the system, say n, and then randomly construct an n-by-n 
lookup table that gives the products of all possible pairwise 
interactions. Representing MEs as A-objects has two 
principal advantages over this "random lookup" strategy: 
• The A-based system is computationally open-ended.11 You 
are not limited to any pre-fixed number of MEs, and you can 
represent any imaginable relation between MEs, since any 
computable function can be expressed as a A-object . 
11 At least in principle; in practice, one must introduce constraints 
on the number of steps in a computation, the length of the 
representation of objects and so forth. 
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• In the A-based system, the representation of MEs codes 
for their function. Thus, it is possible to explore 
relations between structure and function that have no 
counterparts in the "random lookup" scheme. In particular, 
any syntactically correct expression or family of expressions 
can be inserted (or deleted) from the system and the effects 
on organization monitored. Put another way, the A-
representation provides a true genotype-phenotypel2 
. distinction -- and a way of experimentally determining which 
"genes" are responsible for which "body plan" 
characteristics. 
On the other hand, experiments with FOG alone cannot tell 
us whether the structure-function relations that they reveal 
depend upon the A-rep~esentation of its MEs. That is, we 
need other ~rguments to determine whether the algebraic 
structures of organization that Fontana is discovering are 
general principles of emergent organization or merely 
artifacts of his model (and perhaps reducible to theorems in 
A-calculus itself). These arguments must be inductive in 
character. Can these structures (and not others!) be 
observed in other systems, from real or Artificial worlds, in 
which functional interaction can be interpreted as the 
creation of new entities?13 
3.2 Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma; The Dynamics of 
Evolutionary Processes 
Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma (EPD) is a simple example 
of an evolutionary process. The leading natural example of 
an evolutionary process is, of course, biological, and it is 
far from simple. It is hard to think about biological 
evolution now without taking account of its rich 
organizational structure, in particular the hierarchy of 
descent (replicating genes, interacting organisms, evolving 
species -- and beyond) and the economic or ecological 
network, with its complex of relations between organisms, 
revolving around energy production and exchange14 • 
The concept of evolutionary process on which EPD is based 
abstracts away from all this structure. It starts with the 
12 Here a self-maintaining set of A-objects represents the "organism", 
with the syntactic structure of eachA-object representing a gene. The 
phenotype is the (semantic) structure of the interaction graph of the 
set and its reaction products. 
13 Fontana and biologist Leo Buss are currently translating some 
organizational experiments with FOG into the language of evolutionary 
biology, with promising results. A paper on "Algebraic Replicators and 
Units of Selection" is forthcoming. In particular, they provide new 
interpretations of the significance of "life cycles". 
14 For introductions to the literature on hierarchical views of 
evolution, see Hull (1988, 1989), Salthe (1985), and Eldredge (1985). 
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notion of an entity as a set of attributes. Entities are 
capable of self-replication: that is, they can produce other 
entities that have the same set of attributes as themselves. 
Entities with the same set of attributes form an entity type. 
The entities in an evolutionary process form a population, 
and the population consists of more than one entity type. 
Different entities replicate at different rates, so that the 
distribution of entity types in the population changes over 
time. 15 The probability that an entity replicates at any 
given time depends not only on its own attributes but also on 
those of the other members of the population at that time. 
Finally, evolutionary processes include mechanisms whereby 
entities with new kinds of attributes enter the population. 
Frequently, these mechanisms depend upon innovation-
generating errors that take place in the process of 
replication. 
Thus, evolutionary processes are characterized by 
replication (the reproduction of existing entities), 
selection (the differential replication rates of different 
entity types), and variation (the generation of new entity 
types). To determine a particular evolutionary process, it 
is necessary to specify the following e.lements: 
• a set of entity attributes; 16 
• a fitness function (which may be stochastic) that gives 
the replication rate for each entity type, given the current 
distribution of entity types in the population; 17 
• variation mechanisms whereby new entity types enter the 
population; and 
• an initial population of entities. 
For example, in population genetics models used in 
theoretical evolutionary biology, entity attributes are 
typically defined at the genotypic level. The variation 
mechanisms include such genetic operators as mutation and 
recombination. The most problematic element in these models 
is the fitness function, since relative replication rates 
depend on the interactions at the phenotypic level. Thus, a 
15 Entities may also leave the population, for example by dying. 
16 Note that if the process is truly open-ended, Sis an infinite set. 
17 Note that the domain of the fitness function is not the set of 
individual entity types, but the set of possible pqpµlations of entity 
types. The process described here is coevolutionary: the fitness of 
each entity type depends on what other entity types share its world. In 
this sense, the population is an "individual", with entities as its 
"parts", which itself undergoes evolution. Thus, no "landscape theory" 
that fixes a "fitness function" over the set of entity types can 
describe the dynamics of the kind of evolutionary process I am defining 
here, since such a "landscape" is continuously deforming as the 
distributions of the entity types in the population change. 
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genotype's relative replication rate is a function not only 
of how phenotype is determined by genotype, 18 but also of the 
kinds of ecologic relations that different phenotypes have 
with one another (competition, predation, symbiosis and so 
forth). These underlying processes are not at all well 
understood, and so it is impossible to derive the form of the 
fitness function from first principles. In contrast, if 
entities were taken to be organisms (or even species), the 
relevant attributes might be structural or functional 
properties that could be directly related to relative 
replication rates -- but then the variation mechanisms could 
be modelled only phenomenologically. 19 
The designer of an AW evolutionary process faces two 
difficult challenges: how to determine the fitness function 
for an arbitrary population of MEs, and how to create 
variation mechanisms that can supply new types of MEs 
indefinitely. Lindgren solved these problems, and also 
provided a natural language in which to describe his AW, by 
building EPD around a version of Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. 
Each EPD ME represents a strategy for playing a two-person 
game with two possible actions (say, 0 and 1) . 20 This 
strategy is the only attribute of the ME. Each generation, 
MEs interact with one another in a round robin tournament: 
every ME in the population uses its strategy to play a 
particular version of Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma against 
every other ME. 21 The MEs then receive their average reward 
18 Which may of course depend in part on what other genotypes are in 
the relevant population, since this determination is 11environmentally11 
mediated -- and the other entities in the population form part of a 
given entity's environment. 
19 An alternative approach to modelling evolutionary processes begins 
by positing two different types of entities: replicators and 
interactors. Replicators have a fixed structure that can be exactly 
replicated; variation mechanisms then introduce new types of 
replicators. On the other hand, replicators do not interact directly 
with one another; interactors do. So selection operates on interactors. 
The key modelling problem in this approach is to relate the replicators 
to the interactors: in particular, how do the functional properties of 
interactors depend upon the structure of replicators, and how do the 
interactions between interactors determine the differential rates at 
which the replicators replicate? The answers to these questions 
determine the analog of the fitness function described in the text. Hull 
(1988, 1989) argues exha~stively and convincingly for this approach to 
modelling biological evolution. In EPD, the MEs (or strategies, see 
text) are both replicators and interactors. 
20 Each EPD ME is a string of O's and l's of length 2m, where mis an 
integer. The strategy encoding for the ME works as follows: write the 
last m moves (in reverse order: the opponent's last move, your last 
move, the opponent's next-to-last move, ... ); read what you have just 
written as a binary number; go to that coordinate of the your strategy 
vector -- and play the number you find there. 
21 The version has the following features: a) the play is noisy: 
that is, if a player's strategy dictates that he play a 11 0", say, he 
plays a "l" with probability p (pis small, and does not depend on the 
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from these encounters, and they replicate in such a way that 
the expected number of replicates of each ME is proportional 
to its average reward. 22 Thus, the fitness function is 
determined by the representation of MEs, via the pairwise 
interaction rule of the round robin tournament and the 
interpretation of the representation as a Prisoner's Dilemma 
strategy. 
Variation in EPD arises from three kinds of replication 
error, each of which occurs with a fixed probability, 
independently for each transcription event. First, any given 
bit may be transcribed incorrectly (here the probability is 
per bit transcription, so the greater is the length of the 
string representing the ME, the higher the probability of 
replication error). Second, the string may get adjoined to a 
copy of itself, doubling its length (for example, "01" is 
incorrectly copied as "0101"). This error is particularly 
important, since it m~kes the set of possible MEs infinite, 
so that EPD is potentially open-ended. Because of the way in 
which strategies are encoded (see footnote 20), the offspring 
ME resulting from this error has exactly the same strategic 
behavior as its parent. 23 However, its doubled length means 
that it takes account of one more previous move than its 
parent does -- and a subsequent transcription error in any of 
its bits will give rise to a different kind of strategic 
behavior than could arise from any transcription error in the 
parent type. Finally, the string may be cut in half, with 
either half chosen at random as the viable offspring (for 
example, "1101" might be incorrectly copied as either "11" or 
11 01"). 
EPD dynamics exhibit interesting emergent properties. 
First, a succession of stable ecologies -- that is, 
distributions of entity types that persist for many 
generations -- form, dominate the EPD population, and then 
degrade. Both the individual ecologies and their succession 
may be regarded as emergent higher-level structures. Each 
player or the history of the game); b) the payoff per play is as 
follows: if both players choose O ("defect"), they each win 1; if they 
both choose 1 ("cooperate"), they win 3; otherwise, the one who chooses 
0 wins 5 and the one who chooses 1 wins nothing; c) the iteration is 
infinite, and the reward to each player in the iterated game is average 
payoff per play given above. 
22 In Lindgren's version of EDP, population size is kept constant and 
the proportion of each entity type in the next generation is 
proportional to its average reward. If the proportion of any entity 
type falls below 1/N, where N is the nominal population size, the entity 
type is dropped from the population. ,In effect, rather than setting the 
probability of replication for each ME to be proportional to its average 
reward, Lindgren substitutes the expected number of replicates per type . 
While Lindgren's version gains computational efficiency at the cost of 
failing to be a true evolutionary process, it shares the qualitative 
dynamical features described below with the truly evolutionary 
probabilistic replication scheme. 
23 For example, 0101 is the same strategy as 01, since its play depends 
only on the opponent's last move, regardless of its own previous move. 
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ecology may possess one of a number of possible 
organizational forms: some are dominated by a single entity 
type; some have several symbiotic or competitive dominant 
types; in others, the dominant role is distributed among a 
number of "quasi-species" that share some key features and 
differ in others. 
Second, the periods of stasis or "quasi-equilibrium" in 
which a stable ecology persists are interrupted by shorter 
periods of destabilization, which also display certain 
characteristic features. During-a destabilization period, 
the number of entity types in the population fluctuates 
rapidly. Frequently, these periods begin with a large 
"extinction", in which the number of entity types drops 
rapidly. It is also typical that the average reward that MEs 
receives drops during the destabilization periods. In EPD, 
there is no exogenous "environment", so all destabilizations 
are endogenously gene~ated: that is, such phenomena as mass 
extinction and structural disintegration do not necessarily 
require exogenous causes (like asteroid collisions or 
volcanic eruptions!). Destabilization periods end with the 
formation of a new stable ecology, in which the leading 
entity types were not present (or present only at low 
frequencies) in the previous "quasi-equilibrium". 
Contingency plays an important role in EPD ecological 
succession. While it is easy to compute which strategies 
have relative advantages over which, it is not easy to 
predict which sets of strategies will dominate the emerging 
stable ecologies. Start with the same initial populations, 
and quite different successions can occur. For example, 
starting with particular values for the system parameters 
(growth and error rates) and an initial population consisting 
entirely of memory 1 strategies, with probability24 about 0.9 
EPD will end up (by 30,000 generations) in an ecology 
dominated by many different memory 4 entity types that share 
common features in their representation (lxxlOxxxOxxxxOOl): 
Lindgren argues that this particular ecology cannot be 
destabilized by the low-frequency introduction of any 
possible entity type. On the other hand, with probability 
0.1, this ecology will not form, and the system will follow 
some other succession, leading to ecologies whose dominant 
types have memory lengths of 5 or greater. 
These features of EPD dynamics -- a contingent succession 
of "quasi-equilibria" interrupted by "catastrophic" 
destabilization ·periods -- resemble the "punctuated 
equilibrium" version of the history of biological evolution, 
as put forward by Eldredge and Gould (1972) . 25 Their 
appearance in such a simple evolutionary process as EPD 
suggests that they may be generic, at least in some very 
general subclass of evolutionary processes. An important 
24 These probabilities, as reported in Lindgren (1992), are of course 
obtained as frequencies over many runs of EPD. 
25 Somit and Peterson (1992) contains a very interesting series of 
essays on the meaning and scope of punctuated equilibrium. 
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goal for future work with abstract AWs is to try to discover 
the defining properties of this subclass and to gain a better 
understanding of punctuated equilibrium dynamics. What 
characterizes the set of possible stable ecologies? How 
large is the set? To which perturbations is a stable ecology 
robust -- and which destabilize it? Why are the 
destabilization periods relatively short-lived, compared to 
the "quasi-equilibria"? Why are destabilization periods 
frequently initiated by rapid mass extinctions -- and what 
endogenous mechanisms drive these events? What determines 
the order of succession of stable ecologies -- and which 
successions are contingent and which (at least conditionally 
on some predecessors) necessary? 
I conclude this discussion by pointing out two important 
phenomena in biological evolution· that do not arise in EPD 
but could be the targets of future AW research. To explore 
these two phenomena wquld require evolutionary AWs with more 
structural possibilities for higher-level organization than 
are present in EPD: 26 
•Akey ingredient of the "punctuated equilibrium" story 
is that fundamental structural innovation seems to arise only 
in brief destabilization periods, not in the intervening 
"quasi-equilibria", in which various "implications" of the 
fundamental innovations are worked out. Most dramatically, 
all existing animal phyla (and many more, since lost) 
appeared in the Cambrian explosion, a period lasting less 
than two million years, over 500 million years ago (Gould, 
1989). That is, biological evolution seems to produce big 
differences first, in quick bursts, and slowly fills in the 
details. 
• In biological evolution, selection operates at more than 
one level at the same time. Thus, within organisms, cellular 
selection continues to occur (for example, cancers represent 
successful selection at the cellular level that can be fatal 
at the organism level); and, at the same time, higher level 
entities -- like colonies, species, or even ecologies --
compete for resources, reproduce themselves and generate new 
attributes that lead to new colonies, species, or ecologies. 
The coexistence of all these processes constrains the 
structure and d~rection of each of them. 21 
26 An interesting evolutionary AW that addresses at least the first of 
these issues is Thomas Ray's Tierra (see Ray, 1992). 
21 According to Leo Buss (1989), the two phenomena are related: the 
bursts of structural innovation coincide with the emergence of a new 
level of entity, which has successfully developed mechanisms that 
control the selection processes operating on its component entities so 
that they do not favor variants that are harmful to the larger entity of 
which they are a part. 
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3,3 Economics, EHQ and Abstract AWs 
In general, abstract AWs are designed to study processes 
whereby higher-level structure emerges from lower-level 
functional interactions. The two abstract AWs described in 
this paper, FOG and EPD, focus on two different aspects of 
these processes: the characterization of types of structure 
that can arise as a function of constraints on allowable 
interactions; and the dynamics 'of emergent structure. 
Clearly, far more exploration of both of these themes, by 
these and other abstract AWs, must be carried out before we 
can expect to gain useful insights into the lawfulness of EHO 
processes. Once obtained, such insights will serve as a 
background against which it might be possible to understand 
what is generic and what particular to real-world processes 
in which these themes appear to play a role. 
Here I offer an economic example of such a real-world 
process: the coming into being of a new industry. 28 This 
process is central to economic growth and development. The 
point is not that we can apply Fontana's and Lindgren's 
investigations to learn anything interesting about this 
process. Rather, I want to call attention to those of its 
features that appear to exhibit EHO and to argue that these 
features are_ fundamental to understanding what the industry 
comes to "be" and to "do". Furthermore, the most interesting 
questions that arise about the process in my description 
involve precisely the themes that FOG and EPD were designed 
to investigate. 
The emergence of industrial structure 
I begin by sketching what I mean by the structure of an 
industry. An industry can be described in two complementary 
ways. First, the industry can be identified with the set of 
products that it produces. These products are related to each 
other functionally, by the uses to which they can be put, and 
technologically, through the processes by which they are 
made. These two kinds of relations induce a structure to the 
industry's product set. . . 
An industry's product set changes over time, as new 
products and ways to make them are developed. Since new 
products may come from the modification of existing ones (or 
their production processes), products also are related to one 
another by descent. Descent relations induce a hierarchical 
structure on the product set, with higher-level "taxa" 
defined in terms of successively more remote "common 
ancestors". As is the case in biology, the members-of 
higher-level families of products also may share attributes, 
for example, functional complementarities (such as computers 
that share software) or similar production processes (so that 
28 The formulation of this pro,cess, sketched here, is described in 
detail in a forthcoming paper by the author, Franco Malerba and Luigi 
Orsenigo. 
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expertise accrued in making one of the family carries over to 
making others). 
The second·way of describing an industry is as a collection 
of economic entities or "agents". These entities have a 
variety of structural relations with one another, all 
oriented towards developing, making and exchanging products 
in the set described above. At least six classes of entities 
enter into these relations: producers, demanders, suppliers, 
financiers, scientists, and governments. While the industry 
has an organization induced by the relations between its 
component entities, these entities themselves (firms, 
universities, research centers, regulatory agencies) have 
internal structure as well. Thus, an industry exhibits 
hierarchical structure. For example, a firm may have 
subordinate divisions -- marketing, production, R&D -- and 
may also belong to a superordinate entity like a research 
consortium or a trade.association. 
The entities that make up an industry and the kinds of 
relations between them also change over time, as a result of 
the interactions between the entities. Thus, the industry's 
organization is an emergent phenomenon. Consider, for 
example, the case of biotechnology. 29 By 1975, research 
funded by NIH and NSF and carried out by scientists working 
in the biomedical centers of several American universities 
had resulted in the development of recombinant DNA and 
hybridoma technologies. With financing obtained initially 
from venture capitalists (a relatively new kind of financial 
entity, swollen with profits from prior investments in 
microelectronics), some of these scientists set up new firms 
designed to exploit the economic possibilities of the new 
technologies. There were some formidable obstacles to be 
overcome, especially in product selection and development and 
"scaling-up" production volume. 
Lured both by the promise of the technologies and their 
potential competitive threats to existing products and 
production methods, some older, established firms explored a 
variety of techniques to acquire proficiency in the new 
technologies -- ranging from research contracts with 
individual scientists and their universities or with the new 
biotech firms, to buying into the new firms, to setting up 
in-house biotech R&D units. The most active of these 
established firms were pharmaceutical companies, which had 
long-standing ties to the research centers where the new 
ideas originated and thus were well positioned to appreciate 
their implications; and companies with experience in 
fermentation techniques, which were crucial to "scaling up". 
The background and competences of these firms played a key 
role in reinforcing the orientation of the new technologies 
towards medically-related products and, later, extending them 
to agricultural products. By the mid-1980's, the 
interactions between the new research-oriented firms, the 
29 For an excellent analytic account of the emergence of the 
biotechnology "industry" through 1985, see Orsenigo (1989). 
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pharmaceutical companies, the chemical c9mpanies with 
expertise in fermentation, the venture capitalists, the 
universities, and the government regulators had produced a 
distinctive organization of "biotechnology" entities, with a 
burgeoning (if still largely prospective) product set. 
Connections between entities take many forms. Of course, 
some of the interactions between entities take place in 
impersonal markets. But many more involve direct and longer-
lasting relationships. Pharmaceutical and chemical companies 
fund university research, place representatives on the boards 
of smaller, research-oriented companies, send their in-house 
researchers to scientific meetings. Producing firms carry 
out extensive market research into the needs and preferences 
of current and potential customers and use special price and 
service incentives to consolidate long-term ·relationships 
with suppliers and buyers. Competing firms cooperate in 
various research initiatives, form consortia to 'jointly 
produce particular products, work together through their 
trade associations to lobby legislatures and develop 
international markets for their products. 
Industry structure is then the totality of the connections 
between the economic entities that make up the industry. To 
understand how an industry develops, this structure matters, 
for at least two reasons: 
• Not everyone knows how to do everything. The competence 
to perform economic tasks is embodied: particular entities 
have acquired skills, particular ways of doing things, 
through experience and· over time. It is not generally 
possible to transfer these skills without immersion in the 
experiences that gave rise to them. To solve new economic 
tasks, like those that arise in the early days of a new 
industry, it is necessary to patch together solutions to old 
problems, as embodied in the entities with the requisite 
skills. That is, new economic tasks requires new entities, 
which consist of old entities connected in new ways. For 
example, the research-oriented biotechnology firms combined 
the technological skills of the university researchers with 
business plans put together under the auspices of the venture 
capitalists -- and when these firms developed products, they 
formed partnerships with older firms that embodied 
competences in production, marketing and regulatory 
management. 
• To decide what to do next -- what new products to make or 
how to improve production processes -- a producer has to 
ferret out opportunities, which requires knowledge outside 
the producer's current competence. That knowledge is 
embodied somewhere else -- in the tastes or experiences of 
users of the industry's products, in the theories or 
experiments of scientific researchers, in the factories or 
design studios of competitors. And the knowledge can be 
obtained only through the connections that already exist 
between the producers and the entities that embody it. 
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Without the mutual experiences that arise from these 
connections, it is not even possible to conceive of what one 
needs to know about. So who is connected to whom (and how) 
determines in part what directions will be explored and how 
those explorations proceed. · 
Thus, the process whereby new industries come into being 
links two interdependent processes, both of which can be 
viewed as evolutionary in the sense described in Section 3.2. 
The first takes place in the product set; in it, 
technological and functional relations between existing 
products give rise, through the interactions of different 
kinds of agents, to new products. The other occurs in the set 
of agents, amongst whom new connections create new structures 
that embody the solutions to the economic problems posed by 
developing, making and using the.industry's new products. 
The kinds of structur~ to which these linked processes can 
give rise and the dynamics by which they do so ought then to 
be fundamental objects of economic inquiry. Abstract AWs can 
provide an important modelling tool in this enterprise, 
particularly by shedding light on what is peculiarly economic 
about these evolutionary processes. 
4 c1assifier Systems· Modelling Agents that Learn 
In neoclassical economics, agents are modelled as rational 
actors. In this section, I consider a different approach to 
modelling agents, and I describe an AW, John Holland's 
classifier system, that realizes this approach. I then 
briefly discuss two ways to use classifier systems to 
"populate" AWs that are expressly designed to study economic 
phenomena. 
4,1 Rational Actors or Agents Who Learn? 
The concept of rationality that underlies neoclassical 
economics is a particular method for handling the problem of 
choice. In any given choice situation, rational actors are 
supposed to know what they want and what it is possible for 
them to do. While they may be uncertain about just what will 
happen as a result of their possible actions, they at least 
know all of the possible consequences that might occur, and 
they understand how what they get depends on what they do. 
They are rational, because they choose to do that which gets 
them (at least in expectation) the most of what they want. 
There are of course many ways, to criticize this concept and 
its applicability to "real" economic agents. How can agents 
know all these things? Is it plausible (one might say, 
"physiologically justifiable") to suppose that, even if they 
did have the requisite knowledge, they would have the ability 
to compute which act has the highest payoff? And even if 
they could act rationally, i~ there any evidence that real 
agents in fact behave in this way? 
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Here, I want to start with a question more fundamental than 
any of these: can we really come to understand economic 
action by examining "choice"? We -- you and I and economic 
agents -- are immersed in a continuous, ever-changing stream 
of information, partly received as signals from the outside 
world by our sensory apparatus, partly generated internally 
(and recursively) in response to this stream. Before we can 
"choose", we have to select out a small part of all this 
information· and "attend" to it. Then we have to recognize, 
on the basis of the information to which we attend, that we 
face a choice situation. Finally, we have to formulate a~l 
the ingredients that choice situations require: what we want 
to have happen, what options we have, who the other relevant 
actors are, what consequences we can expect. Only at this 
point does a methodology for handling choice -- rational or 
otherwise -- become relevant. 
Thus, our actions, _even those that are based upon choice, 
depend upon acts (of attention, category formation and 
conceptual organization) that logically precede choice and 
cannot, without creating infinite self-referential loops, be 
subsumed under any choice-based theory of action. To found 
economic theory on a choice-based theory of action implies 
that the processes that produce "pre-choice" acts are 
irrelevant to what happens when agents actually get down to 
the business of making their choices. Or to put it more 
precisely, it implies that the actions that economists wish 
to study will be the same, however (and by whomever, the 
modeller or the "real" agent) these unmodelled processes are 
carried out. 
Suppose, on the contrary, that these processes matter, in 
the sense that the kind of economic behaviors in which agents 
engage depend upon the way in which they learn to recognize 
and structure choice situations -- or even that, through 
these processes, agents come to develop certain behavioral 
repertoires (for example, "organizational routines", as in 
Nelson and Winter, 1982), without benefit of "choice", in 
contexts that neoclassical economists simply misidentify as 
"choice situations". Then, the descriptive and explanatory 
power of economic theory would be seriously compromised by 
the very definition of the nature of the agents it takes as 
its subjects of analysis. 
An alternative is to base economics on a learning-based 
theory of action. An agent in such a theory lives in an 
"environment", which might of course include other agents. 
Structurally, an agent can be thought of as a set of sensors, 
a processor, and a set of effectors. The sensors determine 
which states of the environment the agent is able to 
perceive, and the effectors which actions into the 
environment the agent can perform. The sensors transmit 
their perceptions to the processor; on the basis of these, 
and a set of internal states that it maintains, the processor 
sends instructions to the effectors that result in actions. 
The key to learning is the notion of a "reward", which the 
agent receives intermittently from the environment. The 
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"aim" of the agent is to act in such a way to receive an 
increasing quantity of this reward. The agent accomplishes 
this aim by building up and refining a repertoire of actions 
that tend to lead to reward. The instructions for these 
actions are coded in the agent's processor as particular 
sequences of transitions of internal states, triggered by 
particular patterns of perceived environmental states. A 
learning-based theory of action describes how this coding 
takes place and how the code is stored and executed. 
In contrast to a choice-based theory of action, a learning-
based theory directly models the transformation from 
information-stream to actions. That is, all the mechanisms 
that process the information stream on the basis of which the 
agent is assumed to act are handled internally to the theory. 
In principle, agents in such a theory could learn to "choose" 
-- but the theory would be responsible for describing how the 
agents identify situations in which they regard choice as 
appropriate, how they organize what they perceive about the 
environment into the ingredients of a problem of choice, and 
how they develop the methodology that they apply when they go 
about the act of choosing. In other words, "choice" might 
arise as an emergent property in a world (Artificial or not!) 
populated by learning agents. 
To provide an adequate basis for economic theory, a 
learning-based theory of action should provide a 
representation of agents and environments rich enough to 
support such characteristic features of economic behavior as 
the following: 
• The theory should be able to model complicated, changing 
environments, since real economic agerits engage in complex 
interactions, exchanging and transforming many kinds of 
commodities (and information). In the course of these 
interactions, the agents c.an perceive much more than they can 
"cognize". The more restricted is the information that a 
learning-based theory allows its agents to perceive in their 
environment, the less possibility there is for understanding 
the processes whereby economic agents actually come to know 
their complex worlds and their relation to it. 30 
• It should be possible to interpret the internal states 
of agents in the theory so that the agents seem to 
30 While Bayesian decision theory can be interpreted as a learning-
based theory of action, from this point of view it is quite restricted, 
since Bayes;an agents can only process environmental information about 
which they have already "cognized" th.eir opinions (as to its form and 
probability). Moreover, Bayesian decision theory requires that the 
categories that agents use to construct their world, their prior 
opinions about these categories, and their procedures for changing 
opinion and taking action on the basis of opinion be "hard-wired" into 
the model. As a learning theory in the sense described here -- as 
opposed to a theory of choice -- this "hard-wiring" has no prescriptive 
(and certainly no descriptive!) justification. 
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progressively "model" their world: that is, to generate 
broad categories that describe the world, to develop 
plausible hypotheses about the relationships between these 
categories (in particular, those that suggest actions likely 
to produce reward), and to refine these categories and 
hypotheses on the basis of increasing experience. 
• Agents should be able to build up behavioral repertoires 
that include chains of actions that are initiated long before 
the agent obtains the reward they eventually yield. The 
capacity to build up these chains and then to act on them in 
the appropriate circumstances gives an "outside view" meaning 
to strategic behavior, since that is how the resulting 
behaviors might appear to an outside observer, regardless of. 
the internal process by which the agent acquired them. 
• Agents should b~ able to develop the capacity to plan 
future actions on the basis of their expectations of what the 
consequences of these actions will be. This capacity 
provides an "inside view" meaning to strategic behavior. If 
a theory admits the possibility of strategizing, without 
building it in, then it can be used to explore the very 
interesting questions of when agents actually engage in 
strategic action and how they come to do it, especially in 
comparison to the answers given by economic theories of 
choice. 
4.2 Classifier systems; An Introduction 
In a classifier system, the agent is essentially just a 
collection of basic cognitive units, called classifiers. 31 
Each classifier integrates perception, categorization and 
action. A classifier monitors the world, on the watch for a 
particular constellation of perceptible features. When this 
constellation is perceived, the classifier "proposes" that 
the agent take a particular action. 
There are no consistency requirements on the classifiers of 
which an agent is comprised. Thus, propensities to act in 
different, even contradictory, ways, can coexist inside an 
agent. The notion of an agent as a bundle of possibly 
inconsistent behavioral propensities is a far cry from the 
rational prototype of economic theory, whose internal 
consistency is guaranteed by a probability distribution over 
all possible states of the world, well~defined preferences 
encoded in a utility function, and a single principle of 
action: maximize expected utility. 
There are, however, some advantages to a conception of 
agents as inherently inconsistent. First, it is clear that 
requiring consistency imposes great computational costs on a 
31 See Section 4.3 for a formal definition of a classifier -- the 
functional "definition" given in this paragraph (as a circumstance-
specific behavioral propensity) is sufficient for the remainder of this 
section. 
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system, as it entails a lot of internal structure and 
frequent consistency checking amongst different structural 
components. Second, since the world is always more 
complicated than our personal experience, maintaining 
consistency in an agent's behavioral or conceptual system 
almost necessarily requires a reduction in the agent's range 
of possible action, in particular in response to novel 
situations. Finally, there is overwhelming evidence that we 
humans do in fact maintain overlapping and inconsistent 
conceptual systems and associated behavioral propensities32 
perhaps because we are the products of an evolutionary 
process that rewards behavioral flexibility and is 
constrained by computational cost. 
An agent that maintains inconsistent behavioral 
propensities has to have some mechanism that determines on 
which of these propensities it will actually act. After all, 
the world itself prov~des certain kinds of consistency 
conditions for behavior: you cannot move forward and 
backward at the same time. In classifier systems, this 
mechanism depends on a number that is associated with each of 
the agent's classifiers, its strength, which registers the 
"memory" of how well the classifier has served in the past in 
the agent's quest for reward. When different classifiers 
propose contradictory actions in the same circumstances, the 
agent tends to act upon the one that has the greatest 
strength. 
So far, I have described an agent in a classifier system 
statically, as it exists at a particular point in time. But 
agents learn, and learning means changing. Classifier system 
agents learn in two ways: the strength associated with each 
classifier changes with experience, and old classifiers with 
low strength are replaced by new ones. 33 
In order that useful classifiers increase their strength 
over time, the mechanism that changes classifier strength 
must in effect identify actions that lead to reward -- not 
32 See, for example, Lakoff (1987), especially chapter 18, and Holland, 
Holyoak, Nisbett and Thagard (1986), which presents the learning-based 
theory of action underlying classifier systems, along with supporting 
arguments from psychology and philosophy. 
33 It is.worth noting that "learning" in classifier systems has a quite 
different meaning than it does in rationalistic theories like Bayesian 
learning theory. In the rationalistic view, the world is composed of 
definite objects, properties and relations, and "learning" is the 
process whereby an agent forms a mental model of the world that 
correctly describes these features. Learning in classifier systems is 
about acquiring circumstance-specific behavioral propensities that 
function together to produce reward. That is, the agent is learning how 
to act in the world, rather than how to describe it. In the process, 
the agent may or may not develop descriptive categories, causal theories 
and so forth; and even if he does, there is no presumption that these 
categorie~ and theories match some objective features "out there", nor 
would their worth to the agent depend on whether or not they did so. 
See Winograd and Flores (1986) for an extended critique of rationalistic 
learning and decision theories. 
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just those that produce reward directly, but also those that 
"set the stage." Holland introduced his "bucket brigade" 
algorithm to solve this problem. The bucket brigade changes 
classifier strengths in two ways. First, any classifier 
whose action is implemented passes some of its strength to 
its immediate predecessors -- that is, the classifiers that 
proposed actions immediately preceding its own, which helped 
produce the constellation of features that triggered the 
classifier to propose its action. Second, the strength of 
classifiers whose action is implemented when the agent 
receives reward is increased as a function of the reward 
received. In this way, chains of action that culminate in 
reward can in principle build up: initially, the last 
classifier in the chain gains strength with the reward, which 
is passed back link by link as the chain is repeatedly 
executed. And as each classifier in the chain augments its 
strength, the sequenc~ of actions proposed by the chain as a 
whole becomes more and more likely to be executed in the 
appropriate circumstances -- see Section 4.4 below. 
Two kinds of mechanisms are required to carry out the 
operation of replacing old classifiers with new ones. The 
first determines when replacements take place. It is 
desirable for mechanisms of this type to recognize situations 
in which the agent "needs" new classifiers. For example, 
some mechanisms proposed in the literature trigger 
replacement when the world presents features that no existing 
classifier recognizes, while others introduce new classifiers 
that serve to link the actions of pairs of classifiers that 
have been activated in sequence. 34 
The second type of mechanism constructs the new 
classifiers, and here it would be desirable for the new 
classifiers to plausibly improve the prospects for the agent 
to obtain reward. For this purpose, Holland proposes the use 
of genetic algorithms, which build new classifiers by 
combining parts of existing high-strength classifiers. 35 The 
idea, based upon an analogy with the success of sex (that is, 
meiotic genetic recombination) in biological evolution, is 
that useful classifiers work because they are composed of 
good "building blocks", either in the features of the world 
that trigger them or in the actions they recommend -- and 
that trying out new combinations of these building blocks is 
more likely to produce useful new classifiers than is any 
kind of random search through the space of possible 
classifiers. 
At first sight, an agent in a classifier system seems quite 
disagreggated. One might well wonder whether such an entity 
could possibly display attributes that we usually associate 
34 The intuition behind this so-called Triggered Chaining Operator is 
that, logical fallacy to one side, sometimes "post hoc" is "trying" to 
imply "propter hoc"! 
_35 see Goldberg (1989) and Booker, Goldberg and Holland (1989), both of 
which provide good introductions to the literature on genetic 
algorithms. 
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with the human beings or institutions that function as agents 
in an economy. For example, will a classifier system agent 
appear to outside observers to have an "identity" -- that is, 
to manifest predictable behavioral regularities over broad 
categories of circumstances? Can a classifier system agent 
develop "points of view" -- internal models of the world in 
which it functions? If the answer to either of these 
questions is "yes", 36 then it would be reasonable to regard 
these properties as emergent phenomena in classifier systems, 
driven by the ability of agents' learning mechanisms to 
induce a "match" between the agents and their world that 
endows agents with a coherence that is in no sense "built-
in". 
Indeed, a classifier system can be interpreted as an 
evolutionary process, with classifiers as replicators. The 
replicator dynamics are given by the bucket brigade, with 
relative strength rep~esenting relative frequency of 
replicators of each classifier type, while the genetic 
algorithms function as variation mechanisms. In this view, 
the agent is an evolving population of· replicators -- but 
selection of replicators is a function of their joint 
effects, through actions carried out at the agent level. In 
this respect, the classifier system agent is similar to the 
population of strategies in Lindgren's EPD, and it is perhaps 
then not so surprising that structure and coherence at the 
level of the agent should evolve, or that they should 
manifest themselves in the agent's behavior. 
In section 4.4 below, I will review some evidence that, at 
least in relatively simple instances, classifier systems can 
exhibit such emergent phenomena as chains of linked behaviors 
and "mental models" that categorize and provide causal 
explanations for features that appear in the agent's world. 
Indeed, with a little additional structure, classifier system 
agents may even engage in a form of strategic planning. 
Like the A-calculus, classifier systems are computationally 
complete. In addition, they have two particularly desirable 
computational efficiency properties: 
• None of the processing algorithms -- classifier 
activation, bucket brigade and replacement algorithms 
impose heavy memory requirements on the system. All the 
information that has to be retained about classifiers are 
included in their representations and their strengths. It is 
not necessary to "remember" any descriptions of the 
circumstances in which a classifier proposed action or what 
happened as a result; in particular, no information about the 
joint actions of classifiers is maintained by the system . 
• Much of the information processing in all the processing 
algorithms can be carried out in parallel. For example, in 
36 See Section 4.4, where I argue that both these questions may be 
answered affirmatively. 
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classifier activation and the bucket brigade, each classifier 
acts as its own "processor", to determine whether the feature 
constellation it monitors obtains and to pass on strength to 
its predecessors respectively. Similarly, in the principal 
genetic algorithm, pairs of classifiers undergo recombination 
independently of one another. 
4 3 specifying a Classifier system 
Formally, a classifier system is a discrete-time AW that 
models a learning agent and the environment in which the 
agent lives. The current state of the environment is 
represented by a vector, one component of which registers 
whether or not the agent receives any reward in the current 
period -- and if so, how much. The other components code for 
various features of the agent's world, as perceived by the 
agent. Since the environment is represented as the agent 
perceives it, the agent's sensors are implicitly modelled in 
terms of the features registered in the environmental state 
vector. 37 
The state of the environment changes according to a 
·specified dynamic, which may depend upon current and past 
environmental states and the agent's current action. Since 
this dynamic describes how the agent's actions change the 
environmental state, the agent's effectors are also 
implicitly modelled, through their actual effects. 
The agent's processor is represented by two structural 
features: a behayioral repertoire, which determines the set 
of possible actions the agent can take, and a message board, 
which records the agent's current internal state in the form 
of a list of message~. The behavioral repertoire consists of 
the set of all the MEs in the classifier sy,stem. These MEs 
are called classifiers. Each classifier consists of two 
symbol strings, the condition and action strings (say A and B 
respectively}, along with a label identifying the classifier 
and the value of a numerical attribute, the classifier's 
strength. All classifiers have the same number of symbols in 
their representation, say n. 38 
The classifier (A,B} is interpreted as a behavioral rule: 
IF the conditions specified by A are satisfied by the current 
state of the environment and at least one of the messages 
37 The agent is presumed to have access to the current state of the 
environmental vector. As a result, the question of the fidelity of the 
agent's perception does not arise here. Of course, this issue has to be 
confronted when the modeller constructs the environmental state dynamic. 
38 Generally, the symbols represent values of the sensors, internal 
states and effectors. If these values are binary, the symbols come from 
the set {0,1,#}, where# in a condition is interpreted as "don't care" 
that is, disregard the feature represented by any bit whose value is 
i. The specificity of a condition string is the number of non-i symbols 
it contains. 
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currently on the message board, 39 THEN take the actions 
specified by B. There are two kinds of action: external 
actions, which change the state of the environment, and 
internal actions, which send a message to be posted on the 
message board. 40 
The contents of the message board in any given period 
consist of a list of messages sent to it in the previous 
period, along with the label of the classifier that sent the 
message. Each message on the list either does or does not 
satisfy any particular classifier's condition string. It is 
both computationally necessary and makes good modelling sense 
to assume that there is an upper bound to the number of 
messages that can be posted in any period on the message 
board. 
Which actions the agent actually takes in a given period 
depends upon the current contents of both the behavioral 
repertoire and the me~sage board, as follows. First, each 
classifier's condition string is checked against the current 
environmental state vector and the messages currently on the 
message board. Note that this checking operation can be 
carried out in parallel, with each classifier "processing" 
each of the available messages (including the "message" coded 
into the environmental state vector) and determining by 
which, if any, of these it is satisfied. The classifiers 
that are satisfied by at least one of the messages are then 
eligible for activation (see footnote 39) . 
Next, a subset of the eligible classifiers are selected for 
activation. It may not be possible to activate all of the 
eligible classifiers, for two reasons. First, the action 
strings of different classifiers may dictate changes to the 
environmental state vector that are mutually inconsistent. 
This inconsistency has to be resolved in some way in order to 
assign a definite value to. the environmental state vector for 
the next period. Second, if more classifiers send messages 
than the message board can hold, some mechanism must 
determine which of these messages get posted. In either 
case, a competition between the relevant set of eligible 
classifiers determines which of them actually execute their 
actions. The rules of the competition vary from one 
implementation of classifier systems to another, but the 
basic idea is always the same: the greater is the strength of 
a competing classifier, the more likely it is that its action 
will be executed. 41 
39 In most implementations, each classifier actually has two condition 
strings, and both must be satisfied before the classifier's action is 
eligible for execution. In this way, internal and environmental 
conditions may interact to trigger particular behavioral responses 
(hence the conjunction "and" in the text). 
40 A single classifier may produce both types of action. 
41 Typically, the competition is probabilistic, with the probability 
that a given eligible classifier will be selected proportional to some 
increasing function of its strength. Sometimes, other attributes of the 
classifiers besides their strength affect their probability of 
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The strength of a classifier whose action is executed can 
change in three different ways. First, it must pay for this 
right with a (fixed) fraction of its strength. This payment 
is distributed amongst those classifiers whose posted 
messages in the previous period satisfied the conditions of 
the winning classifier. Second, if after all the acts are 
executed, the environmental state indicates that the agent 
has obtained a reward, then this reward is shared out to 
increase the strength of each of the winning classifiers.42 
Third, if classifier posted a message on the message board, 
it has the chance to gain strength in the following period, 
in the form of payments from those classifiers whose 
conditions its message turns out to satisfy (and which 
themselves win the right to execute their actions). In 
addition. to these "bucket brigade" streQgth changes, some 
implementations of classifier systems impose a small strength 
tax every period on ail classifiers in the behavioral · 
repertoire, in order to expedite the replacement of useless 
classifiers. · 
Implementations of classifier systems use a variety of 
different mechanisms to replace low strength classifiers. 
Most systems replace a fixed fraction of classifiers at 
regular intervals. Generally, classifiers are deleted with 
probability an inverse function of current strength. In 
addition, as described in section 4.2, it is possible to add 
event-dependent triggering conditions and algorithms for new 
classifiers tailored to the triggering events. For example, 
when no classifier's condition is satisfied by the current 
set of messages, the s·o-called Cover Detector Operator 
constructs a new classifier whose condition string is 
satisfied and whose action string is chosen in some random 
way. 
The most important general algorithm for constructing new 
classifiers is recombination, a genetic algorithm. To 
_implement this algorithm, select two "parents" from the 
current behavioral repertoire, with selection probability 
proportional to strength. To produce two "daughter" 
classifiers, first copy each parent. Next, choose two 
position indices (integers between 1 and n inclusive), and 
exchange the symbols in the copied classifiers between these 
selection. These include specificity (the number of different features 
of the environment or internal state that are "checked" by the condition 
string) and support (the number of different messages on the board that 
satisfy the classifier's condition string). Both of these measure, 
though in different ways, the extent to which a particular classifier is 
"tuned" or adapted to the particular circumstances of the agent and the 
environment. The more specific is the satisfied condition, the more the 
classifier "exactly fits" the particular situation; while high support 
indicates a fit of the classifier to other behavioral elements in the 
agent's repertoire. 
42 Note that each classifier whose action is executed receives a share 
of the reward, whether or not its action had anything ·to do with the 
agent's obtaining the reward. The sorting out of "causal" from 
noncausal actions takes place statistically, over time. 
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two positions. The two classifiers that result from this 
operation are the daughters. One of the two daughters is 
then chosen as the replacement classifier, with strength 
initialized as some function of the strengths of its parents. 
In summary, to construct a classifier system, one must 
specify the following ingredients: 
• symbol string representations for the environmental state 
vector and for classifiers; 
• a dynamic for the environmental state vector; 
• versions of the activation, bucket brigade, and 
replacement algorithms; 
• an initial population of classifiers. 
4 4 classifier systems; Emergent Properties 
At the end of Section 4.1, I listed some criteria for an 
economically useful learning-based theory of action. In 
particular, the agents in such a theory ought to be able to 
construct "mental models" of their world, to build up 
repertoires of temporally-linked behaviors that culminate in 
reward, and to plan future actions based upon expectations of 
consequences. In this section, I discuss some work that 
suggests that classifier systems can produce emergent 
properties satisfying each of these criteria. 
categories and default hierarchies 
The world presents itself to us as a ceaseless succession 
of sensory stimuli. To form our mental models of the world, 
we have to endow it with a set of objects, properties and 
relations, in terms of which we reason, develop causal 
hypotheses, plan our actions. The process whereby we 
construct this set, from the raw material of sensory stimuli 
and the changes in our subcognitive "internal states" they 
trigger (and, recursively, from the elements we have already 
constructed), is a process of category formation. 
How we form categories, and what structure the resulting 
categories come to have, are difficult and important 
psychological and philosophical problems. 43 At first sight,44 
it might appear that the categories we use to describe the 
43 See Lakoff (1987) for a stimulating survey of recent research on the 
process of category formation and its profound psychological and 
philosophical implications, many of which challenge the foundations of 
neoclassical economics. Lakoff stresses the importance of the 
experiential and biological bases of categorization. His analysis is 
supported and extended by the evolutionary and neurophysiological 
arguments of Gerald Edelman (see Edelman, 1992, for an introduction and 
references). 
44 Which, in the history of philosophy, lasted a long time -- from 
Aristotle to Wittgenstein! 
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world are "natural" -- that is, they merely reflect the 
structure of the world itself and hence can be defined as a 
set of necessary and sufficient conditions on perceived 
"states of the world". 45 However, there are deep reasons why 
the idea that there can be a simple isomorphism between the 
structure of the world and our mental models of it fails 46 
and with it, the classical conception of categories as 
mirrors-of-the-world. In addition, there is abundant 
evidence that the categories we use to describe the world are 
not reducible to sets of "states of the world" and in fact 
exhibit complex internal structure. 47 As we shall see, these 
features also characterize the principal structures that 
represent categories in classifier systems, default 
hierarchies. 
A default hierarchy (DH) is a set of classifiers, whose 
condition strings differ in their specificity. 48 The most 
general classifiers in the hierarchy establish "default" 
values for the category that the DH represents. These values 
may be overruled or modified by some of the more specific 
classifiers at the next level of the hierarchy -- and so on, 
down the hierarchy. 
For example, consider a category that we could call "things 
to avoid". A DH representing this category might include a 
general classifier of the form "IF a large vehicle is moving 
towards you THEN turn and move quickly out of its path 11 • 4 9 
This classifier establishes a good general policy for 
avoiding traffic accidents on city streets. However, if you 
want to travel by bus, it might be good to have an exception 
rule of the form "IF you are waiting at a bus stop and a bus 
moves towards you THEN wait where you are". These classifiers 
might in turn be supplemented by the even lower-level 
45 Note that if categories actually had this structure, then any 
category X could be expressed as a simple disjunction (over different 
states of world) of rules of the form "If [state A] then [category X]" 
-- and thus would be directly expressible in a classifier system. 
46 See, for example, Lakoff (1987), chapter 15, for a discussion of 
Putnam's Theorem, which establishes the internal inconsistency of 
objectivist semantics. 
47 For example, our categories typically display prototype effects 
that is, some instances of a category are consistently regarded as more 
"typical" or "central" than others (for example, a robin is a more 
central member of the bird category than is a penguin; and blue is a 
more central color than is violet). Prototype effects are inconsistent 
with the classical conception of a category as a set of objects with 
membership criteria defined by necessary and sufficient conditions on 
some attribute set. 
48 That is, the number of non-# symbols in their condition-strings; see 
footnote 38. 
49 Note that this classifier links the recognition of a category 
instance to an appropriate behavior. This pragmatic orientation is a 
general feature of classifier system categories. A classifier system 
supports categories not just to "name the world", but because it has to 
act in it. Those categories that help the system obtain reward are the 
ones that are reinforced and consequently persist and ramify. 
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exception rule "IF you are waiting at a bus stop and a bus 
moves towards you and fails to slow down THEN turn and move 
quickly out of its path." 
In a default hierarchy, even though the component 
classifiers may contradict one another, they actually work 
together to define complex categories efficiently. Good 
general classifiers benefit the system of which they are a 
part, because they cover many possible situations and produce 
an appropriate action for most of them. On the other hand, 
more specific exception classifiers, which generate better 
actions in the situations their condition-strings match, can 
accumulate high strength. As a result, they tend to win 
bidding competitions in these situations against the general 
classifier whose action theirs contradicts, particularly when 
bidding rules favor classifiers with higher specificity. 
This does two good things for the system. First, it leads to 
appropriate actions in these situations. Second, it protects 
the valuable general classifier from losing strength, by 
preventing it from winning bidding competitions and 
consequently paying out strength, in situations where it is 
unlikely to gain strength by producing an action that results 
in reward. As a result, it is possible for all the members 
of a DH to maintain relatively high strength values, which 
increases the probability that the DH will persist inside the 
classifier system. Thus, for example, without having to 
maintain a lot of specific rules that cover every imaginable 
interaction between you and large vehicles, a two-rule 
default hierarchy will still allow you to avoid being run 
over .and to catch the bus when you need to. 
Notice that DHs represent categories implicitly: the 
"meaning" of the category is distributed among all the 
classifiers that make up the DH representing it. This fact 
has two important consequences. First, it is possible for a 
category to "function" but have no "name" -- that is, no way 
to refer to it inside the classifier system. Second, the 
"meaning" of categories can change over time. New classifiers 
are always being generated by the' system's replacement 
operators, and some of these new classifiers will function 
interactively {competitively or cooperatively) with 
classifiers in the DH. As a result, the "meaning" of the 
category represented by the DH will change, in the sense that 
new situations will be recognized as instances of the 
category or new actions will be taken when certain instances 
are recognized. Of course, such changes in the "meaning" of 
categories corresponds to experientially-based learning by 
the agent that the classifier system represents.so 
so A third consequence of the distributed "meaning" of categories 
represented by DHs is that they share many of the attributes that recent 
psychological research has established for our categories. For example, 
not all instances of a category represented by a DH have the same 
membership status, since different instances trigger different 
classifiers in the representing DH, with different ensuing bidding 
competitions and outcomes. As a result, for example, some kinds of 
36 
Categories can also be referred to explicitly in classifier 
systems, through the use of tags. A tag just corresponds to 
a particular symbol substring, for example "001" occurring at 
the 6th through 8th position of a condition or action string. 
Tags can name categories. Using tags, the system can support 
classifiers that recognize the category named by a tag, say B 
(IF state A THEN #B#, where iB# is a stri~g with the tag B 
and all other positions "don't care"), and others that take 
appropriate action when the system has recognized the 
category (IF aBc THEN action C, where aBc is satisfied if 
some B-recognizing classifier has posted its message the 
previous period, and perhaps some additional conditions, 
represented by a and c, are met). In this way, categories 
can link directly to other categories, and "abstract" mental 
models can be represented in the classifier system. Because 
they require specialized subsets of classifiers for 
recognition and response, tagged categories have more complex 
structure than their untagged counterparts, but DHs are 
equally suitable for both representation tasks. 
So far, I have described how categories can be repr·esented 
in classifier systems. The question of real interest, of 
course, is different: will DHs that represent categories 
actually emerge? In general, this is hard to prove: not 
only must the classifier system produce the DH -- but we, as 
observers, have to recognize that it did so! In one of the 
most impressive of the relatively few studies addressing this 
critical question, Riolo (1989a) provided a strong case that, 
in some circumstances, DHs in fact emerged in a particular 
classifier system. 
Riolo investigated the performance of a classifier system 
that detects 8-bit binary vectors and must determine which of 
four categories they belong to. The highly nonlinear 
function that determines the "real" categories is, of course, 
unknown to the system. The system is rewarded whenever it 
achieves a correct classification. 51 Starting with a random 
set of 100 classifiers, Riolo's system was able after 30,000 
trials to correctly classify the input vector over half the 
time. By "interpreting" the high strength classifiers in the 
instances may always be recognized as belonging to a category, while 
others may be accorded membership sometimes and sometimes not. Hence, 
classifier system categories give rise to prototype effects -- see 
footnote 46. For many more examples, see Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett and 
Thagard, 1986. 
Sl Note that a perfect solution to this problem is possible --
obviously, with 256 separate classifiers, one for each "state of the 
world"; not so obviously, with only 17 classifiers, by taking advantage 
of the structure of the encoding function. ·As such, it is a very 
different world than the one we -- or interesting modelled economic 
agents! -- inhabit. Clearly, the larger is the set of classifiers in 
Riolo's system, the less incentive there is to achieve a "compact" 
categorization by maintaining general rules in a DH. Conversely, the 
smaller the classifier set, the more "pressure" on the system to 
organize its categories efficiently -- and so the more likely it is that 
DHs might emerge. 
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system and analyzing their interactions, Riolo was able to 
show that the classification was accomplished by means of 
categories represented by DHs. It is worth noting that some 
of the interactions between the general rules and their 
exceptions in some of these DHs were subtle; expressing the 
categories represented by these DHs in English -- clearly an 
inappropriate language for this world -- would be quite 
difficult! 
Riolo 1 s work not only provides strong evidence that DHs 
representing categories can in fact emerge in classifier 
systems, but it also gives some insight into conditions under 
which this is likely to happen. For example, bidding rules 
that favor more specific classifiers'turn out to be necessary 
to maintain DHs in the system (Riolo, 1987b), as do 
provisions that prevent the random removal of high strength 
classifiers (Riolo, 1989a). Whether DHs will emerge in more 
complex classifier systems like those that might be used to 
model economic agents· -- and whether we will be able to 
interpret the categories they represent if they do -- remain 
·questions for future research. 
Classifier chains and strategic action 
Viewed from the outside, agents -- firms, chess players, 
urban racoons foraging for food -- appear to act 
strategically when they carry out a sequence of separate but 
linked actions that culminate in a favorable outcome. Seen 
once, the action sequence might appear coincidental. The 
more it recurs in circumstances which turn out similarly well 
for the agent, the more we would tend to regard the agent and 
the behavioral sequence as "strategic" -- particularly if we 
had seen the agent initially respond in different ways to the 
kinds of situations that later trigger the sequence, then 
engage in bits and pieces of the sequence, and finally put it 
all together and repeatedly act it out in the appropriate 
circumstances. 
Classifier system agents are capable of this kind of 
strategic action. Linked chains of classifiers can emerge, 
such that each successive classifier acts to bring the system 
closer to reward and also sends a message that triggers the 
action of the next classifier in the chain. The system can 
maintain these chains -- and they can be assimilated into 
longer sequences, that either begin temporally even further 
from the eventual reward, or end by producing even more 
reward for the system (see Wilson, 1985, Riolo, 1987a, 
Robertson and Riolo, 1988, Riolo, 1989b). 
For such chains to emerge, the classifier system must be 
equipped with special bidding rules and replacement 
operators. In the next several paragraphs, I describe how 
links between classifiers are accomplished in classifier 
chains and review some of what is known about the conditions 
under which classifier chains can emerge. 
The links in a chain of classifiers are forged by means of 
tags. To see why tags are necessary, consider the following 
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example. Suppose Al, A2, A3 are classifiers of the form "IF 
the world is in state Si THEN change it to Si+l" (i = 1,2,3). 
Moreover, suppose that the classifier system gains reward 
when the world is in S4. Then, if the world starts out in 
S1, and our three classifiers fire sequent~ally, the world 
ends up in S4 and the system gets reward, which all goes to 
A3. What about the other two classifiers, who set the stage 
for A3? So far, they get nothing. In fact, they lose, 
because in order to execute their actions, they have to win 
bidding competitions and pay out their winning bids to their 
"suppliers" . 52 Thus, this "chain" (so far unlinked except 
through its "function") will not last very long. 
Now suppose we modify these classifiers in two ways. First, 
suppose Al and A2, in addition to changing the state of the 
world through the system's effectors, also post messages in 
the form of tags, say B1 and B2 respectively. Second, 
suppose that A2 has the tag B1 and A3 the tag B2 in their 
condition strings. 53 Through these tags, Al is now a 
"supplier" of A2 and_ A2 of A3 -- and as a result, strength is 
paid out down the chain, from A3 to A2 and A2 to A1. In this 
way, reward won by A3 will eventually result in an increase 
to the strengths of both its predecessors. 54 
Evidence suggests that tagged links between classifiers are 
unlikely to develop by chance -- at least at a fast enough 
rate to generate functionally useful classifier chains 
(Robertson and Riolo, 1988). As a result, "strategic" 
classifier systems require a special mechanism, called a 
Triggered Chaining Operator (TCO), to bind together 
classifiers that plausibly might function usefully as part of 
a classifier chain. The TCO creates a pair of coupled 
classifiers in the following way. First, it selects a 
classifier B that was active and experienced a net strength 
gain in period t -- and another classifier, A, that was 
active in period t-1. So far, there is no relation between A 
and B; the idea, however, is that A's action in period t-1 
might have helped set the stage for B's strength gain in the 
next period. So the TCO creates two.new classifiers, A and 
52 In this simple case, their suppliers are just the detectors, which 
posted messages identifying the successive states of the world: It 
turns out in general a bad idea to pay out bids to detectors, for 
reasons perhaps clear from this trivial example! 
53 Formally, this requires that they have two condition strings, as 
described in footnote 39 above. 
54 Higher-level representations of chains can also be achieved by 
tagging an entire chain, in addition to the link-by-link tags described 
here. This sort of tagging essentially makes the chain into a category 
-- organized diachronically; in contrast to the synchronic categories 
described above. In this way, the system can refer to the entire chain, 
"mobilizing" it into action as a unit -- or terminating its execution 
before completion, should circumstances warrant. Research has not yet 
been carried out on the conditions under which such higher-level 
structures can emerge. 
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B, which are joined by a tag (in the action string of A and 
the condition string of B), but otherwise identical to A and 
B. Through the tag, A triggers B. 
If there is any benefit to the system in the connection 
between A and B, A is essentially volunteering its services 
-- while A is paid for its efforts by B's bid. As a result, 
A has a much better chance of staying around, and the system 
does better as a result. On the other hand, if there is no 
benefit to the connection, B, with its additional triggering 
requirement of A's tag, will not fare well relative to Band 
will soon disappear from the system -- and without its income 
from B, so will A. 
The story is not complete yet: why should B prosper 
relative to B? After all, Bis triggered whenever Bis 
and sometimes when it is not. What if there are other 
favorable situations for B -- or if Bis only active after A? 
In either case, B has no obvious .advantage over B. If the 
action of A or some other stage-setter is necessary for B's 
success, then the overall system suffers if B (and other 
linked versions of B) cannot supplant B. Bis free-riding on 
the stage-setters it requires for its reward, and as their 
strength declines, so does the system's opportunities for 
reward -- not to mention B's as well. 
This is a serious problem, because unlinked classifiers 
like B have to precede linked classifiers like Bin the 
system -- they are the building blocks out of which long 
chains are constructed. Thus, by the time the linked 
versions come onto the scene, via TCO, the unlinked versions 
are already established and tend to have relatively high 
strength. Unless classifiers like B have some bidding 
advantage over classifiers like B, the prospects for building 
up long action chains is not bright. Several solutions to 
this problem have been proposed in the literature. For 
example, it is possible to bias bidding competitions towards 
classifiers that appear to fit the general context better --
that is, are supported by a greater number of the messages 
currently on the message board (see footnote 41). This gives 
Ban advantage over B whenever A is active, since A supports 
B but not B. 
Riolo (1989b) presents striking evidence that these 
mechanisms work. He worked with a classifier system designed 
to negotiate its way through a 4-level, 16-state feed-forward 
network, with reward possible only when the system entered 
one of the four possible fourth-level states. Without TCO, 
the system learned how to proceed from the third-level states 
to the fourth-level reward state, but essentially nothing 
more. With TCO and two mechanisms designed to solve the 
"free-rider" problem described in the last paragraph,55 the 
55 One was the inclusion of support in bidding, as described in the 
text. The other was a modification in the way the genetic operators 
deleted classifiers when adding new ones to the system -- only 
classifiers that had submitted a bid in the current period were eligible 
for deletion. This modification served to limit the number of copies of 
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system performance greatly improved, through the emergence 
and maintenance of effective classifier chains that guided 
the system from each first-level state of the network to the 
payoff state. 56 • 
Lookahead and strategic planning 
Suppose some classifier system agents actually had the 
capabilities described in the last two subsections. That is, 
they could form categories that described useful features of 
their world, and they could generate chains of actions that 
tend to culminate in reward. Would such agents count as 
rational actors, in the sense described in Section 4.1? 
To answer this question, first recall how rational actors 
decide what to do. They begin by recognizing that they are 
in a choice situation. Next, they determine their possible 
courses of action and forecast the consequences of each of 
them. Finally, they Ghoose the course of action that 
promises them the most favorable outcome. 
Now, how might our idealized classifier system agents 
behave? With their ability to categorize, they could come to 
recognize situations in which it would be appropriate to 
activate one of a number of their chains of actions. 
Moreover, they would "choose" which of these chains to 
activate on the basis of the relative strengths of the 
chains' constituent classifiers, which of course reflect the 
agents' experience of the chains' relative benefits-- and 
hence their "expectations" of the chains' benefits in the 
current situation. 
These two descriptions sound quite similar. However, they 
mask a key distinction in the way in which the two kinds of 
agents form their expectations of benefit from a particular 
course of action. Classifier agents look backw.ards, since 
they base their expectations on classifier strengths, which 
aggregate over every past experience with the relevant 
action. In contrast, rational actors look forward: starting 
from the current state of the world, they envision what 
consequences will follow if they take the action under 
consideration -- until they reach some end-state whose value 
can be determined. Typically, they have to consider more 
than one end-state for each possible action, since the future 
unlinked "free-riding" classifiers, which otherwise tended to swamp the 
newer linked versions in bidding competitions. 
5 6 Negotiating the network with transitions chosen at random yields an 
average score of 150 per three-transition trial; perfect performance 
yields the maximum payoff per trial of 1000. With TCO, the system 
achieves an average score of around 400 after about 3000 trials, and 
does not improve much thereafter. With the modified bidding and genetic 
rules described in the text and in footnote 55, the average score jumped 
to over 600 after 3000 trials and then continued to increase, reaching 
nearly 800 after 12000 trials. One additional modification, designed to 
"encourage" the formation of chains that traverse less frequently 
encountered paths achieved further improvement, producing an average 
score over 900 after 12000 trials. This last modification extends the 
idea of the Cover Detector Operator, described in Section 4.3. 
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depends on other contingencies than the current state and the 
rational actors' actions. When this is the case, they 
evaluate the benefits of taking a particular action by 
averaging over the benefits of the different possible 
consequences of that action. 
This might not seem to be such a big difference, since, 
after all, rational actors have to base their scenarios for 
the future on what they have learned from the past. But this 
is misleading: the difference between forward- and backward-
looking strategies is indeed profound. In particular, the 
forward-looking strategy requires two capabilities that our 
classifier system agents so far lack: 
• Rational actors need to generate explicit predictions of 
future states of the world, and to do so they must have 
methods for storing information about how these states have 
changed in the past in response to their own actions. In 
contrast, classifier system agents do not predict future 
states of the world explicitly. Moreover, it is not clear 
how classifiers that were designed to predict would survive, 
since a classifier's strength accrues only with respect to 
its action's usefulness in obtaining reward, not with respect 
to how well it predicts changes in the state of the world. 
• Rational actors have the capability of operating in a 
"putative mode", in which they run their predictive models 
counterfactually to discover what the future may hold for 
them (that is: IF the world .wu:e. in state A THEN take act B 
arui the world would enter state C; IF the world~ in state 
C THEN ... ). In contrast, in classifier systems there is no 
putative mode: every action always results in a real change, 
either to the state of the world or to the systems' internal 
state; and any action changes the strength of the classifier 
that proposes it, through the system's bidding rules. 
Both Holland (1990) and Riolo (1990) have recently shown 
how to design classifier systems that can operate in the 
putative mode. Such systems require surprisingly few 
modifications of the basic classifier system architecture. 
Moreover, all of the required modifications can be carried 
out without violating the fundamental principles of 
classifier design, including parallel processing and local 
memory storage. Here are the essential modifications, as 
introduced by Riolo: 
• Representations: In order to express what happens in the 
putative mode, two representation problems have to be solved. 
First, it is necessary to distinguish between "putative" and 
"real" states of the world. Riolo solves this problem 
efficiently, with a single-bit tag attached to all messages 
that refer to states of the world; the value of the bit 
establishes in which of the two modes, putative or real, the 
state is meant to obtain. Second, the system must support 
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classifiers that express predictions of future states of the 
world. Here, Riolo uses classifiers of the following "P+A" 
(prediction+ action) form: IF the world is (or were 
depending on the current mode!) in state X THEN take action Y 
and the world will be in state z. In the real mode, this P+A 
classifier specifies an action (Y) and predicts that the next 
state of the world will be C, which may or may not turn out 
to be correct. In the putative mode, however, the classifier 
generates a putative action (Y again) -- and determines the 
next putative state of the world {C) •57 
• Mode-switching: The system needs rules that determine 
when it enters and leaves the putative mode. Riolo's system 
enters the putative mode in response to messages about the 
state of the world received from its detectors, 58 and it 
leaves it either when some action reaches a threshhold level 
of support or when "too much" time has elapsed (in which case 
its next "real mode" act is determined by a bidding 
competition). In particular, if a sufficiently well-
supported action is available, the system simply acts 
otherwise, it goes into the putative mode to "decide" what to 
do. 
Once in the putative mode, the system can use P+A 
classifiers to explore the future consequences of its 
currently available "real mode" acts. Here, the crucial 
design question is how to choose between these acts on the 
basis of this exploration. The difficulty is that the world 
does not provide reward in the putative mode. There are a 
variety of possible solutions to this problem. For example, 
the system could predict in which states of the world it will 
obtain reward, and then use a simulated reward as a basis for 
its choice. The system must then of course distinguish 
between classifier strength that reflects~ reward and a 
local, putative mode strength augmented by simulated reward. 59 
57 Clearly, it is important to supplement the system with replacement 
algorithms that generate a sufficient supply of such structured 
classifiers when needed. See Riolo (1990) for examples. 
58 And recognized by special classifiers that post messages declaring 
"putative" states of the world, in response to messages from detectors 
or from "prediction" classifiers. The preceding footnote also holds for 
this type of classifier. 
59 Riolo uses a version of this idea, in which the predicted simulated 
reward is represented implicitly. He associates a second, "local" 
strength with each classifier. In contrast to "real" strength, "local" 
strength changes in the putative as well as in the real mode; its value 
in a particular execution cycle of the putative mode reflects the "real" 
strengths of the classifiers it activates, directly or indirectly. The 
support that determines which "real" action to take depends on the 
"local" strength of the classifiers associated with each of the possible 
actions. In the putative mode, then, "local" strength is passed from 
classifier to classifier by a variant of the usual bucket brigade 
algorithm. In addition, the "local" strength of unused classifiers is 
adjusted so that it comes to reflect the classifier's "actual 11 strength. 
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• Effective prediction: To predict accurately, the system 
must keep track not only of how useful P+A classifiers are, 
but how well they predict what happens next. Strength serves 
for the first of these tasks, but for the second, Riolo 
introduced yet another quantity associated with each 
classifier. This quantity, which measures the classifier's 
predictive effectiveness, only pays attention to the 
prediction part of a P+A classifier's action. It is updated 
every time the classifier is activated in the real mode, by 
taking a weighted average of its past value with an indicator 
variable that is 1 if. the prediction is correct, 0 
otherwise. 60 A P+A classifier's bid (in either mode) is an 
increasing function of bQth its strength and its predictive 
effectiveness. 
Riolo (1990) provid~s convincing evidence that these 
modifications work. In three different task domains, the 
modified system comes to learn enough about how its world 
behaves to predict the consequences of its actions and to 
plan its actions accordingly -- and, finally, to achieve a 
high level of task performance. Thus, at least with respect 
to problems of the _complexity of maze-learning and navigating 
around obstacles, classifier system agents appear capable of 
strategic planning -- and hence rational action. Moreover, 
in Riolo's experiment, some interesting cognitive features 
emerge. For example, the more the system masters a 
particular task, the less time it needs to spend planning how 
to carry it out. That is, in these systems, planning is a 
response to unfamiliarity and its consequent uncertainty. 
Given a sufficiently regular world, the need for planning is 
self-limiting. 61 
As both Holland and Riolo acknowledge, there is a lot of 
room for improvement in their system designs. For example, 
the systems' predictive capabilities do not yet have much 
statistical sophistication. In particular, in Riolo's 
system, every prediction is about the "entire" state of the 
60 In Riolo (1990), the weights do not change (the reported implements 
places a weight of 0.9 on the past value and 0.1 on the indicator). It 
might be preferable to have the weight depend on how often the predictor 
is invoked, at the cost, of course, of remembering this ·extra 
information. 
61 This is consistent with a large body of psychological research 
contrasting the performance of human experts with novices. For example, 
expert clinicians typically generate~, not more, conjectures in the 
course of a diagnostic consultation than do medical students or 
residents, and they use less data to distinguish among the conjectures 
they do generate. From this point of view, the function of the 
"putative mode" activity of strategic planning is to facilitate the 
process whereby agents come to generate the categories and associated 
chains of action that guide their "real mode" behaviors. When the 
process is successful, explicit planning is no longer necessary --
"plans" are implicit in organized actions. 
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world and is either exactly right or exactly wrong -- neither 
very useful features in a complicated world. In addition, it 
would be very desirable to construct a classifier system that 
could function in more than one task domain and develop 
predictive models based on appropriate categories for each of 
them. Again, particularly for economic modelling, there 
ought to be more than one kind of "reward" that agents can 
obtain from their environment, and it would be good if they 
could develop the ability to establish preferences amongst 
these different rewards. But these opportunities for 
improvement should not obscure what has already been 
accomplished: classifier systems represent an approach to 
modelling agents in which agent "identity" and even 
rationality can reasonably be regarded as emergent 
properties. 
4.5 Economic Modelling with Classifier systems 
In this section, I will briefly describe two AWs that apply 
classifier systems to economic problems. The microentities 
of both of these AWs are classifier systems, which represent 
economic agents. Thus, these AWs have a built-in 
hierarchical structure, since their microentities are 
themselves AWs. Interesting properties emerge at both levels 
in this hierarchy: as a result of their interactions with 
each other, the individual classifier system agents come to 
take on coherent "identities"; and an ecology of agents 
forms, with aggregate-level pattern and structure. 
Repeated Wicksell triangles and the emergence of money 
Marimon, McGratton and Sargent (1990) constructed an AW 
based on classifier system agents, which implements a multi-
period Wicksell triangle economic environment introduced by 
Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). This environment is populated by 
three different types of agents, who produce, exchange and 
consume three different types of goods. Each of the agent 
types can produce exactly one type of good (different for the 
different types) and gains positive utility only by consuming 
a single, different type of good (again different for 
different types). Thus, trade is necessary to satisfy wants 
in this environment. 
At the beginning of each period, each agent holds one good. 
Agents are randomly paired with one another, and each agent 
must make two choices. First, he must decide whether or not 
to exchange his good with the one held by the agent with whom 
he is paired. If both agents decide to trade, an exchange 
takes place. At this point, each agent decides whether or 
not to consume the good he now holds. If an agent consumes 
his good, he immediately (without cost) produces a 
"replacement", whose type of course depends on his type's 
production capability. Thus, regardless of whether or not he 
decided to consume, at the end of the period each agent again 
holds one good. Before the next period begins, the agents 
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must pay a storage fee, which depends on the type of good 
they are holding. 
The accounting that underlies decision-making in this model 
trades off utility gains from consumption against storage 
costs. 62 Agents clearly might want to trade either for the 
type of good they like to consume or for goods with lower 
storage costs than the one they currently hold. In addition, 
they might conceivably want to speculate by obtaining and 
holding a good that they hope will bring them a "profit" in 
subsequent period trades that is sufficient to offset a high 
storage cost in the present period. What strategies agents 
will actually pursue -- either rational agents trading in 
equilibrium or classifier agents learning how to act --
depends on a complete specification of the parameters of the 
environment: the production functions (that is, which agent 
types produce which good types), the agent type-specific 
utility functions, th~ relative storage costs of the 
different good types, and the proportion of each type of 
agent in the environment. 
Kiyotaki and Wright assumed that the agents who populate 
this environment satisfy the usual rationality assumptions, 
and they calculated Markovian Nash equilibria for a number of 
particular specifications of the environment. 63 In contrast, 
Marimon, McGratton and Sargent (hereafter MMS) use classifier 
systems to represent their agents. Their primary interest 
was to discover whether these classifier system agents would 
learn their way into the Kiyotaki-Wright equilibria -- and, 
in situations in which there was more than equilibrium, which 
one would the classifier agents prefer. Their hope was that 
models with classifier system agents could support and even 
extend standard neoclassical theory, by providing a mechanism 
for arriving at equilibria, a tool for finding equilibria 
when direct calculation is intractable, and a way of 
distinguishing between multiple equilibria. As we shall see, 
this hope was not realized. 
With agents restricted to Markovian strategies, the 
Kiyotaki-Wright environment is a very simple world. 
"Reasonable" agents really only have one choice to make: they 
have to.decide which of the two types of goods to which they 
62 Of course, this accounting is explicit in the Kiyotaki and Wright 
models, but only implicit (and distributed amongst all the classifiers 
that constitute a particular agent!) in the Marimon, McGrattan and 
Sargent AW. The description of strength changes in the text below shows 
how these quantities affect the strengths of individual classifiers. 
63 These equilibria of course depend on the model specifications. In 
particular, for some specifications, Kiyotaki and Wright found 
equilibria in which the good with lowest storage cost served as "money" 
(that is, in every exchange, each participant obtained either a good he 
wanted to consume -- or the "money" good). Other specifications 
produced equilibria that included some speculative exchanges, as 
described in the previous paragraph of the text. And still other 
specifications supported more than one equilibria. 
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assign zero utility they prefer to store between periods! 64 
Of course, the problem is harder for classifier system 
agents, because they are not a priori reasonable -- nor do 
they even have a priori knowledge of their utility functions 
or the storage costs that will be imposed on them. 
MMS use two linked sets of classifiers to represent their 
agents. One of these sets codes rules for exchange, the 
other rules for consumption. Exchange rules are of the form: 
IF you hold good type in set A and your trading partner holds 
good type in B THEN C; where A and Bare subsets of {1,2,3} 
and C is either "trade" or "don't trade". Consumption rules 
have the form: IF you hold good type in A THEN D; where Dis 
either "consume" or "store". 65 
To decide whether or not to exchange and then whether or 
not to consume in period t, each agent holds successive 
bidding competitions in its two classifier sets. The 
classifiers that submit the highest bid in their respective 
competitions win -- call these winning classifiers Et and Ct 
respectively. Of course, the consumption competition occurs 
after the action specified by Et has been carried out. 
Agents learn through changes in strength to the classifiers 
that win the competitions in each period. 66 As usual, winners 
lose strength when they pay out their bids, and they gain 
strength from the payments of the bids of the winners of the 
"next" competition (Ct pays Et, and Et+l will in turn pay Cd . 67 
Reward comes from consumption. If Ct's action is "consume", 
it is credited with the utility gain the agent experiences 
from consumption, and its strength increases as a result. In 
64 I am supposing that agents know which type of good has positive 
utility for them. "Reasonable" agents will always exchange for this good 
and then consume it (assuming, of course, that the utility they derive 
from consumption is greater than the storage cost of the good they 
produce as a replacement). And since agents do not produce the good 
they like, the only way they can end up with the good they neither like 
nor produce is to exchange for it (if they don't start with it) or keep 
it (if they do) -- and then not consume. 
65 Note that all actions are "external", so the system does not use the 
standard classifier message list. Instead, its short-term memory only 
records which classifier of each type won the last competition. 
66 Because the possible choices for agents are so limited -- even 
without assuming "reasonableness" -- MMS could represent all possible 
strategies with computationally tractable classifier sets. They also 
considered variant models with some standard replacement operators 
(Cover Detectors, Cover Effectors, specification mutations and 
recombination). 
67 Note that the action of Et leaves the agent with the good that 
matches the condition of Ct, whose action in turn leaves the agent with 
the good that matches the condition of Et+l· So this is just the usual 
"payment to supplier" idea, without the usual message list. MMS do not 
use the standard bucket brigade to determine the magnitude of strength 
changes. With their strength updating algorithm, strength reflects 
average payoff per activation, rather than total payoff as in Holland's 
system. For a justification of this change in terms of convergence 
properties, see Arthur (1990). 
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addition, storage costs have to be paid. Since Ct's action 
determines which type of good the system holds between 
periods t and t+l, its strength is reduced as a function of 
the cost of storing this good. 68 
What happens in the MMS AW? First, the agents develop 
coherent behavior patterns: they trade to obtain goods they 
like to consume or to lower their storage costs, and they 
consume for the same reasons. As a result, "money" emerges 
in this AW: in every transaction, an agent either obtains a 
good he wants to consume or "money", that is, the good with 
lowest storage cost. Thus, organization occurs at both 
levels of this hierarchical AW: the agents develop coherent 
economic identities, and the economy they form is 
characterized by structured patterns of trade. 
Second, the stable trading structure that emerges in this 
AW does not necessarily correspond to a Markovian Nash 
equilibrium. In particular, classifier system agents are 
reluctant to speculate -- that is, to hold a good with high 
storage costs in the hopes of trading it in the next period 
for a desired consumption good -- even when it is "rational" 
for them to do so. Thus, the classifier system agents do not 
organize themselves into an equilibrium trading pattern in 
Kiyotaki-Wright environments that support only speculative 
equilibria. Rather, they "prefer" to trade only for 
immediate consumption or "cash". 69 As a result, the idea to 
use classifier system agents in a mere supporting role in 
equilibrium theory seems a dead end. 
An artificial stock market 
The second example of an economic AW with classifier system 
agents.is currently being developed by Brian Arthur, John 
Holland, Richard Palmer and Paul Tayler (hereafter AHPT) . 70 
68 A peculiar feature of the MMS dynamics is that they impose the same 
classifier systems on every agent of a-given type. This means that when 
strengths are modified as a result of an interaction between any two 
agents, changes are made to all agents of the same type as the two 
interactors. MMS justify this imposition of "representative agents" in 
terms of savings in computer time and space, but it .violates the spirit 
of AW modelling. In particular, it means that MMS could not probe the 
extent to which (path-dependent) heterogeneity between initially 
homogeneous agents can arise in their economic environment. 
69 Of course, it is not particularly surprising that MMS agents do not 
speculate, since to do so, they would have to form linked chains of 
actions -- and as we saw in Section 4.4, these are unlikely to emerge 
without system rules that promote them, like Triggered Chaining 
Operators. In addition, the "representation agent" constraint described 
in the previous footnote makes it impossible to explore variant within-
type agent behavior. With within-type agent heterogeneity and some 
provision for differential replication rates for agents with different 
behaviors, perhaps more interesting behaviors might arise in a Kiyotaki-
Wright environment. 
70 Unfortunately, there is not yet any detailed description of the AHPT 
AW in print. My account is based primarily on preliminary material 
given in Arthur (1992) and personal conversations with AHPT. As a 
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Their AW models a simple stock market, in which a single 
security is traded. This security pays a dividend, which 
varies stochastically with respect to the outside interest 
rate. Each period, agents can place orders to buy or sell a 
single unit of stock, or they can do nothing. They base 
their decisions just on the information contained in the time 
series of past prices, dividends and interest rates. When 
the buy and sell orders are in, a specialist fulfills all 
trades and uses an algorithm based on current price and 
excess demand to declare a new price for the next period. 
An AHPT agent consists of a set of classifiers that code 
for predictions of future price movements, based on past 
stock prices and returns. These predictions have forms like: 
"IF last period price exceeds twice fundamental value 
(dividend/interest rate) THEN price will go down" or "IF the 
average price of the last five periods exceeds the average of 
the last 50 periods THEN price will go up". At the beginning 
of each period, a bidding competition amongst each agent's 
matched classifiers determines the agent's prediction for the 
next period's price. If the prediction is that prices will 
rise next period, the agent places a buy order; if the 
prediction is that prices will fall, the agent sells; 
otherwise, he holds. Winning classifiers are rewarded on the 
basis of the (one period) profits that result from the 
transaction they initiate. · Current versions of the AW 
consist of 100 agents, each with 60 predictor classifiers. 
Genetic algorithms periodically generate new predictors for 
each agent. 
In the AHPT world, stock price is determined each period on 
the basis of the action of all the agents, which in·turn 
reflect complicated interactions between their constituent 
pred~ctors. How well any given predictor functions depends 
in turn on the market's overall price dynamics. As a-result 
of this complexity of interaction and feedback between 
levels, the behavior that emerges in this system, both at the 
level of the individual agents and at the level of the 
market's price dynamics, is very rich. According to Arthur's 
summary account of experiments with AHPT, price begins by 
fluctuating around fundamental value. But then "mutually 
reinforcing trend-following or technical-analysis-like rules" 
establish themselves in the predictor populations. Later, 
other phenomena, such as speculative bubbles and crashes, can 
be observed to occur. Moreover, the market does not seem to 
settle down to any stationary state, as in the MMS AW. AHPT 
test for this by cloning and "freezing" successful agents and 
then reintroducing them much later into the system, where 
they turn out to perform poorly, since they are no longer 
adapted to the behavior of the other agents in the market. 
This may happen despite the fact that the price series itself 
appears stationary to an "outside observer". 
result, it is even more sketchy than the other model descriptions 
reported in this paper. 
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AHPT's primary purpose in designing their artificial stock 
market was to gain insight into the reasons why real-world 
traders perceive _their markets as they do. According to 
Arthur, "traders t;alk about the 'mood of the market', its 
'nervousness', or 'confidence' for example; they take 
technical trading rules or 'chartism' seriously; they see 
temporary surges and crashes as more than random 
fluctuations." None of this makes sense from the point of 
view of neoclassical economics. AHPT's hope was to design a 
system in which such features arise as the result of the 
interactions amongst heterogeneous agents, each capable of 
learning about the world their joint actions are creating, 
but exploiting different frames of reference that generate 
~ifferent ~local" opportunities for successful action. They 
seem to be succeeding in this enterprise. The next step is 
to figure out how to carry out experiments with their AW that 
will shed some light on how and under what circumstances 
these kinds of phenomena emerge. 
5 Artifigipl Economies and the Problem of 
coordination 
Perhaps the most surprising thing about an economy is that 
there is such a "thing" at all. From one point of view, an 
economy appears totally disaggregated: every firm separately 
decides what to produce, every consumer what to buy, and all 
these decisions are based just on agent-specific needs, 
interests and information. Why should anything coherent 
result from such a process? Yet it does: an economy 
exhibits large-scale structure -- with organized markets, 
mutually dependent but distinct industries, trade 
associations, labor unions and so on -- and relatively stable 
macroeconomic descriptors that vary slowly compared to the 
rate of change of the underlying microeconomic decisions over 
whose consequences they aggregate. The problem of 
coordination is: where does this order come from? That is, 
what are the mechanisms whereby Adam Smith's Invisible Hand 
accomplishes its task? 
s.1 Two Approaches to the Problem of coordination 
Neoclassical economic theory places at the center of its 
account of coordination a single concept: Walrasian price 
equilibrium. 71 In a Walrasian equilibrium, the market 
efficiently coordinates the actions of agents, through the 
prices it assigns to,the various commodities. The great 
71 A Walrasian equilibrium is a system of prices for commodities such 
that, if agents exchange freely at these prices, (i) each agent will 
obtain a set of commodities that provides him with the maximum 
attainable value (given his initial endowment), and (ii) all markets 
will clear (that is, the supply for each commodity will exactly equal 
the demand for that commodity). 
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triumphs of neoclassical theory are mathematical theorems 
that guarantee the existence of Walrasian equilibria, when 
competition is "perfect" and agents "rational", 72 and 
algorithms for computing equilibria, given assumptions about 
production capabilities and agents' endowments and values. 
On the other hand, there are several unsatisfactory aspects 
of the equilibrium account of coordination. First, it does 
not explain how the market arrives at a Walrasian price 
equilibrium. Quite the contrary: attempts to provide a 
dynamic account of out-of-equilibrium price formation have 
yielded more and more general counter-examples to the 
proposition that price adjustments to over-supply or over-
demand result in convergence to equilibrium prices. Second, 
it is based on unrealistic assumptions about agent behavior 
and market conditions. Firms and consumers do not form 
expe~tations about the future or decide what to do in the 
rational manner that the theory posits, and competition is 
frequently far from perfect. Third, and most important, many 
of the most striking aspects of real-world economic 
coordination play no role at all in the theory. In 
particular, the real economy is constantly changing: new 
kinds of commodities are developed, then produced and traded, 
and richer institutional linkages connect agents over wider 
and wider geographical areas. It is hard to see how the 
problem of the coherence of such a system can be addressed 
with a theory that fails to assign a central role to 
processes of innovation and change, in what economic agents 
can do and the structures through which they act. 
Artificial Worlds provide another approach to the problem 
of coordination. In this approach, economic coordination is 
regarded as a special kind of EHO, and the central question 
is to find the attributes of specifically economic objects 
and interactions that result in specifically economic forms 
of aggregate pattern and structure. Artificial Economies are 
Artificial Worlds whose microentities represent economic 
agent~ and products. Interactions between these 
microentities model fundamental economic activities --
production, exchange and consumption. Unlike the Artificial 
World models described in Section 4.5, Artificial Economies 
are meant to represent "entire" economies. Thus, they have 
certain closure properties: for example, what consumers 
spend in one market of an Artificial Economy, they are paid 
in another. 
When an Artificial Economy is populated with an initial set 
of agents endowed with an inventory of products, and the 
72 In perfect competition, agents may take prices as given when they 
decide what to buy and sell,· ignoring the effects of their actions on 
the prices that obtain. Rational agents are able to form rational 
expectations about future contingencies and they always act so as to 
maximize their own expected utility. Even with these assumptions, the 
"equilibrium guarantee" only covers certain conditions on production 
functions and agent's values. 
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values of its system parameters have been fixed, 73 the economy 
can be "run". Under some conditions on population and 
parameters, the resulting economy exhibits such emergent 
features as stable growth paths for the Artificial Economy's 
analog of GDP, Pareto-law distributions for firm size, and 
characteristic product life-cycle curves -- under others, no 
sustained growth or orderly industrial structure at all takes 
place. The purpose of Artificial Economy experimentation is 
to discover what kinds of structured economic regimes can 
occur and to see how they depend on system parameters and the 
characteristics of the constituent agents. 
In contrast to General Equilibrium models, Artificial 
Economies are inherently dynamic. 74 While General Equilibrium 
modellers start by assuming a desired outcome state 
(Walrasian equilibrium), the designer of an Artificial 
Economy is first of all copcerned to model how economic 
agents interact -- the institutional arrangements through 
which interactions take place, as well as the ways in which 
agents take advantage.of the opportunities these arrangements 
afford. The more plausible are the assumptions about agents 
and institutions built into an Artificial Economy, the 
better: 75 the argument that emergent aggregate regularities in 
the Artificial Economy are causally related to observable 
macrofeatures of real economies depends on the match between 
the characteristics of the microinteractions built into the 
Artificial Economy and those that actually take place in real 
economies. 
Artificial Economy have to be "playable" -- and so a lot of 
institutional details have to be explicitly specified. For 
example, events have to be scheduled to occur in a logically 
meaningful and physically realizable order -- a firm cannot 
produce until it has hired the workers it will use to do so. 
Also, market rules have to spell out how prices are formed 
and who ends up trading with whom, as a function of the 
allowable actions of the agents who trade in the market. And 
if firms can borrow, some form of bankruptcy law has to be 
implemented, since a firm might find itself unable to make 
good on the terms of its loans. One of the most interesting 
experiences i~ designing and experimenting with an Artificial 
73 For example, in the Artificial Economy described in section 5.2 
below, most of these parameters control features of the economic 
environment that affect innovation, such as technological opportunity, 
degree of appropriability of new technologies, cumulativeness of 
research, and extent of learning-by-using. 
74 By "dynamic", I do not mean merely "time-indexed", as the term is 
used in the literature on intertemporal equilibria. Rather, I mean that 
the model specifies transition laws that govern how its state at time t 
transforms into its state at time t+l, and these laws are not a function 
of future states (as they are in rational expectations theory). 
75 In particular, agents in an Artificial Economy are constrained to 
make their decisions in a psychologically plausible way, in the face of 
future contingencies about which they ~an be no better equipped to form 
rational expectations than is the designer himself! 
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Economy is coming to realize that these institutional details 
matter -- and that any theory that leaves them out is 
sweeping something crucial under the rug. 
s 2 An Artificial Economy 
In this section, I describe an Artificial Economy developed 
by myself in collaboration with Giovanni Dosi, Marco Lippi, 
Jim Pelkey and Paul Tayler (hereafter DLLPT) . 76 This model 
extends work reported in Chiaramonte, Dosi and Orsenigo 
(1992), which in turn was inspired by models in Nelson and 
Winter (1982). Perhaps the most ambitious and well-
documented model that could be considered an Artificial 
Economy is the MOSES model of the Swedish economy described 
in Eliassen (1985, 1989). All of these models (again in 
contrast with equilibrium theory) are inspired by 
Schumpeterian insights into the disequilibrating effects of 
competition, and assign a central role to processes of 
innovation -- both successful and "mistaken" -- in their 
accounts of economic coordination. 
Here are brief descriptions of the microentities in the 
DLLPT Artificial Economy and their principal modes of 
interaction: 
• Microentities: There are five types of agents (Sector 1 
and Sector 2 firms, a bank, researchers, and laborers) and 
two types of products (machines and consumer good). Sector 1 
firms hire laborers to produce machines. 77 In addition, they 
hire researchers to develop new types of machines. Sector 2 
firms buy machines from Sector 1 firms and use them, together 
with labor, to produce a consumer good. Researchers and 
laborers use their wages to purchase this good, which they 
then consume. The bank pays interest on savings from firms 
and workers, lends to firms at an interest rate that it sets, 
and funds the formation of new firms. 
76 I chose this model to summarize because I am most familiar with it 
and because its inferential difficulties, discussed in the next 
section, are generic. 
77 All their other production inputs are free. 
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• Innovation: Sector 1 research is designed to discover 
machine types that can perform better than the machines the 
firm is currently capable of producing. Each machine type is 
described by two positive numbers: one measures how much it 
costs to produce, the other its efficiency in production. The 
Artificial Economy's model of technological innovation then 
corresponds to a controlled stochastic process moving through 
R2+, where the control variables are the amounts a firm 
invests in each of three types of innovative activities. 
This stochastic process specifies, for each type of 
innovative activity, the probability of successful outcome of 
a given research project and the performance indices of the 
machine type that results from a successful project. The 
probability of success depends on: how much money the firm 
invests in the.project; system parameters that measure the 
degree of appropriability of innovations and the 
technological opportunity for each type of innovative 
activity; and firm-specific parameters that reflect cumulated 
research know-how from prior investment. 
The three types of research activity in which Sector 1 
firms can choose to engage are radical innovation, 
incremental innovation and imitation. Radical innovation, if 
successful, produces a machine type belonging to a new family 
or "technological trajectory" of machine types. Successful 
incremental innovation leads to a new machine in the same 
"technological trajectory" as one the firm currently knows 
how to produce. For the same investment, radical innovation 
has a lower probability of success than incremental 
innovation; but when radical search succeeds, it typically 
produces a machine type whose performance characteristics 
represent a greater advance than what is achieved from an 
incremental innovation. Imitative search targets a machine 
type currently produced by a competing Sector 1 firm. The 
search succeeds if the imitating firm learns how to produce a 
machine type on the same "technological trajectory" as the 
targetted type (though not necessarily as efficient as the 
target) . 
• Market Rules; There are three markets in the Artificial 
Economy: the market in which Sector 2 firms buy machines 
produced by Sector l; the market in which workers buy the 
consumer good produced by Sector 2; and the labor market, in 
which Sector 1 and Sector 2 firms hire laborers and 
researchers. 
The machine market features production to order. Sector 1 
firms issue catalogues listing the machine types they produce 
along with machine prices, and Sector 2 firms place orders 
for the machines they wish to purchase. Machines are payable 
on delivery, so a Sector 1 firm may receive more orders than 
they can fill, in which case they accept orders on a first-
come, first-served basis. Sector 2 firms whose orders are 
not accepted may place orders for their second and third 
choices before the market closes. 
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Consumer goods are sold at a fair held at the end of the 
production year. Each firm determines how much of the good 
to bring to the fair and what prices to charge for what it 
brings. Workers have full access to the prices asked by each 
seller, and they buy, first-come first-served, from the 
cheapest to the more expensive. The fair closes when all the 
good is sold or there is no more consumer demand. 
The labor market operates as a hiring hall, at the 
beginning of each year. Each firm determines the wage rates 
they are willing to pay (one for researchers and one for 
laborers), and the workers sign up on a first-come first-
served basis, from the highest- to lowest-paying firms. 
Firms may fail to hire their desired quota of workers, in 
which case they invest the unspent research or production 
dollars in the bank; or there may be unemployment, in which 
case unemployed workers forego all consumption for the year. 
Note that in none of these three markets are prices 
negotiated. Markets that allow price negotiations require 
more complicated inputs from participants: in addition to 
quantity and price inputs, negotiating strategies have to be 
supplied. 
• Banking Rules; The Artificial Economy has only a 
rudimentary banking sector. There is a single bank that sets 
an interest rate for savings and another for loans. Firms 
must exhaust savings before they can borrow. Loans are 
issued for fixed periods that depend on the borrowing firm. 
Each firm faces a credit cap that depends on its previous 
year's net turnover. Annual interest and principal payments 
are due at the end of every year. 
Firms that cannot meet the required annual payments are 
allowed to postpone payment for one year. During this year, 
the bank will issue an emergency loan covering some 
production costs. This loan must be paid back over the next 
two years and no other emergency loans will be granted during 
this period. Two successive failures to repay all 
outstanding loans force a firm into bankruptcy. The assets 
of a bankrupt firm are scrapped. 
• Firm Decision-Making -- Sector 1; Firms make their 
decisions according to "~rganizational routines" that are 
modelled as particular forms of decision rules. These rules 
are typically functions of three types of arguments: 
adjustable environmental parameters, firm-specific parameters 
that describe aspects of the firm's "psychology" of decision-
making (risk-aversion, time-discounting, etc.), and past 
observables such as the firm's previous period sales, degree 
of labor rationing experienced, orders received and so forth. 
The rules are based either on the empirical literature on 
firm decision-making or on approximations to "optimal 
decision-making under uncertainty", with heuristic methods 
for forming expectations of future aggregate quantities. 
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Sector 1 firms decide how much to pay workers, which 
machines to list in their catalogues and how much to charge 
for them, how many research workers to hire and what tasks to 
assign them, how many laborers to hire, how much to bor·row, 
and how much to produce of which type of machine. 
How much to pay workers: Firms of both sectors try to 
maintain their position in the labor markets, so if they paid 
a bonus in excess of the average overall wage rates in the 
previous period, they offer at least the same bonus in the 
following period. They raise their bonus only if they 
experienced labor rationing in the previous period, in which 
case the increase is a fixed function of the extent of that 
rationing. 
How much to charge for listed machines: A new machine is 
priced according to a mark-up rule: that is, it is priced at 
a firm-specific multiplier times the machine's production 
cost. For previously_ listed machines, the firms adjust the 
previous period price in response to three factors: change 
in production costs (that is, wage rates), change in sales, 
and the quantity of unfilled orders (which represents a kind 
of backlog of demand for the machine). The .adjustment rule 
depends on firm-specific "reactivity" parameters. If the 
adjustment rule determines a price below a firm-specific 
minimum acceptable mark-up rate, the firm ignores the rule 
and uses this minimal mark-up rate to set its price. 
Which machines to list: Firms want to produce machines 
that will be attractive to their customers. To Sector 2 
firms, evaluating a machine involves trading off between its 
price and its productivity in use. The Sector 2 firms 
accomplish this trade-off through a payback period criterion,· 
in which they estimate the profit they will obtain by 
operating the machine for a firm-specific length of time. 
The longer this length, the more they are willing to pay to 
obtain a more productive machine. Sector 1 firms then use 
the same evaluation functional to decide whether to go into 
production with new machine types their researchers have 
designed; they use pay-back periods that are reported to them 
by their own customers. (This allows a certain amount of 
"market segmentation" to emerge: some Sector 1 firms 
producing low-cost, low-productivity machines for their 
customers who favor short pay-back periods, while others 
produce high-cost, high-productivity machines for a different 
set of customers.) 
How many research workers to hire and what tasks to assign 
them: Firms invest a firm-specific proportion ·of their 
previous year's net turnover in research. Total research 
investment is allocated to the three types of search activity 
according to a formula determined by two firm-specific 
parameters. Which machine types to incrementally improve or 
imitate are determined by calculating expected returns for 
the investment, where the expectations are based on the 
firm's experience with previous incremental and imitative 
research projects. 
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How many laborers to hire. how much to borrow and how much 
to produce of what: All orders are filled up to the firm's 
credit ceiling. This determines how much the firm borrows 
and how many laborers it can hire. If it receives more 
orders than it can fill, it produces the most profitable 
machines first. 
• Firm Decision-Making -- Sector 2; Like Sector 1 firms, 
Sector 2 firms have to decide what wages to offer to laborers 
and how much to borrow from the bank. In addition, they have 
to decide how much to produce and what prices they will 
charge, which of their current stock of machines to use in 
production, how many and which new machines to order, and 
which machines to scrap. 
Determining prices: First, the firm calculates the costs 
of production with each machine in stock and those it 
considers purchasing._ Next, using a statistical procedure 
together with data from previous years, it forecasts the 
highest price that will paid at this year's consumer good 
fair. It then decide·s compares production costs with 
anticipated sales, machine by machipe, to determine which 
machines to use in production. Finally, it sets its prices 
by reducing its estimated cutoff price by a safety margin 
that depends on a firm-specific "timidity factor". This 
process simultaneously determines price and selects which 
machines to employ in production. 
Investing in new machines: After deciding (as above) which 
of its current machines to use in production, the firm 
calculates how much cash and credit it could apply to 
expanding its machine stock. It evaluates machines offered 
for sale according to the payback period criterion already 
described, and it orders the available machines for which it 
projects a profit over its payback period. If it can afford 
its first choice, it orders it; else it orders its second 
choice if it can afford that one. It then iterates this 
process until it can no longer afford any desired machine. 
Scrapping machines: Any machine that is not used in 
production in three successive periods is removed from the 
firm's capital stock. 
• Agent Demography; The number of researchers and laborers 
grow exponentially. New firms are created according to 
several different schemes; the rate of creation depends on 
average profitability rates in the two sectors. New firms 
are funded by the bank for a fixed period to engage in 
product research (Sector 1) and to purchase capital stock 
(Sector 2). Their attributes are selected according to the 
empirical distribution of currently existing firms. Firms 
die when they no longer generate positive net turnover and 
cannot qualify for bank loans. 
In all, there are 15 system parameters in the.Artificial 
Economy. In addition, the behavior of each Sector 1 firm is 
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determined by 8 firm-specific parameters, while 3 suffice for 
each Sector 2 firm. Sensible initialization of such a large 
parameter set, while difficult, is made easier by the fact 
that almost all of these parameters have a direct economic or 
psychological interpretation, and it is possible to define 
clusters of related parameter values that form "natural" 
metaparameterizations of "economic regimes". 
s 3 some Difficulties with Artificial Economies 
As the last section makes clear, there really is not such a 
thing as a short summary description of an Artificial Economy 
A lot of details are required to specify "playable" 
institutional arrangements and the agents who have to operate 
in them. Clearly, there is more than one way to specify any 
of these details. In the DLLPT Artificial Economy, for 
example, why organize the consumer good market as a fair 
instead of an auction? Does it matter that machine 
manufacturers produce to order instead of building up 
inventories? Why should firms use payback-period accounting 
and mark-up pricing rules? And so on, on and on. As a 
result, any Artificial Economy is open to criticism on the 
grounds that its design is arbitrary. 
A first response might be that it is necessary to start 
somewhere: if you can show that "macroeconomic" stability 
can emerge from the dynamics of "microeconomic" interaction 
in ~ recognizably "economic" environment, 78 then you have 
increased the plausibility of the proposition that real-world 
economic coordination is an instance of EH0. 79 Unfortunately, 
this response does not go very far. Artificial Economies, 
unlike the Arrow-Debreu model, lack the virtues associated 
with a high level of abstraction -- simplicity and 
mathematical tractability. This produces a real barrier to 
their social extension. The more richly detailed a model is, 
the more intriguing it is to its designers -- but the less 
likely it is to capture anyone else's imagination or 
interest, which flags at the first ad hoc and unshared 
assumption. Without mastering the microlevel details built 
into an Artificial World, it is simply impossible to come to 
a reasoned judgement on whether an observed aggregate-level 
property is in fact emergent -- or merely a consequence 
easily derived from the superposition of some particular 
microlevel features. And without this judgement, the whole 
point of the Artificial World is lost. 
If arbitrariness cannot be abstracted away, what then? 
Here are two complementary research strategies for coping 
78 More particularly: in one that does not assume away the question by 
invoking "representative agents" (see Kinnan, 1992). 
79 This "existence proof" justification is similar to that frequently 
given for taking the Arrow-Debreu model seriously: the Arrow-Debreu 
model shows that at least one kind of "economic" environment (surely as 
remote from a real economy as the Artificial Economy described in the 
last section) supports Walrasian equilibrium. 
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with the problem. First, building on ideas already in the 
economic "mechanism design" literature, one could at least 
delimit degrees of arbitrariness by developing functional 
taxonomies of the various institutional arrangements that 
have to be introduced into an Artificial Economy. For 
example, is there a minimal characterization of the 
functionally different types of market rules or bankruptcy 
laws? Similarly, one might try to construct a typology of 
"nonoptimizing" decision-making strategies (or perhaps 
orientations) that are economically relevant. Such 
taxonomies would help to define the set of Artificial 
Economies that have to be investigated to make general 
assertions about EHO in real economies. 
Second, one could change the notion of what an Artificial 
Economy is, away from the idea of a single parameterized 
model that specifies a priori its institutional forms and 
agent behaviors. Instead, imagine an Artificial Economy as 
an experimental environment in which users can easily tailor 
models designed to suit their own particular research 
agendas. Object-oriented programming techniques can be used 
to construct such an environment, which would consist of a 
library of different kinds of modelled institutions and agent 
types, together with an interface that makes it easy for 
users to combine different items from this library to make 
particular experimental economies. The interface might also 
feature statistical and graphical features that aid in the 
discovery of emergent properties in these experiments -- and 
procedures for summarizing experimental designs and relevant 
results in a way that they can be assimilated into a data-
base that all users could access and analyze. 80 With such a 
tool, assuming a sufficient number of users found it 
attractive, Artificial Economy research might become better 
characterized as diversified than arbitrary. 
There is another, more serious, difficulty with current 
Artificial Economies. They offer only very limited scope to 
the emergence of new structures -- and, so far, none at all 
to the emergence of higher-level entities. What gg, emerge 
are patterns -- in macroeconomic variables like GDP, in 
aggregate descriptors of industrial organization (like firm 
size) and innovative demography (like innovation rate as a 
function of age and size distributions of firms), and in 
product life-cycles. But no Artificial Economy yet has a way 
of representing the kinds of innovations in entity structure 
at the level of the firm and of the industry that are 
sketched in Section 3.3. In fact, even the entities that the 
current Artificial Economies do represent are not capable of 
much change in what they do or how they do it. 81 Nor do any 
BO A prototype that implements these ideas is currently under 
development. 
81 MOSES firms can engage in new kinds of activities (for them), but 
they do not develop novel ways of carrying these out. Firms represented 
by parameterized behavioral rules for their "behavioral routines" hardly 
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of the Artificial Economies represent products in such a way 
that new "kinds of" commodities (as opposed to the sort of 
technological development described in the previous section) 
arise endogenously; to do so would require even more 
elaborate representations for agents, since really new 
products must coevolve with "tastes" for them. Thus, 
Artificial Economies are not open-ended computationally, even 
to the extent of the other principal Artificial Worlds 
reviewed in Sections 3 and 4. Though there are some obvious 
ways to improve this situation -- for example, using adaptive 
representations for agents, like classifier systems or even 
neural nets -- real progress will require new insights in 
economics about the nature of the structures that need to be 
represented as well as new computational techniques for the 
representations themselves. 
6, An Afterword 
As we have seen, Artificial Worlds differ substantially 
from the kind of "minimalist" models on which much of 
neoclassical economic theory is based. Structurally, 
Artificial Worlds are populated with a variety of 
heterogeneous microlevel "agents" who enter into complex 
interactions with one another. The "agents" must respond to 
an environment that is formed in part as a result of the 
collective history of their interactions. Their response 
potential is programmed into the Artificial World, but for 
the World to work, there must be some degree of open-
endedness in the way this potential manifests itself. From a 
computational point of view, this is the great challenge in 
designing Artificial Worlds, and we have seen a variety of 
approaches to this problem, from FOG's intensional functional 
representation, to the genetic operators used in EPD, through 
the whole gamut of replacement operators and "bidding 
competition" structures in classifier systems. 82 
Of course, the difference between Artificial Worlds and 
most neoclassical economic models is more than structural: 
they are designed to explore different kinds of questions. 
Artificial Worlds are about EHO, and if EHO is an important 
kind of phenomenon in real economies, then Artificial Worlds 
will have a'place in economic theory. I have argued that 
there is a variety of economic phenomena that seem to 
manifest the cha~acteristic features of EHO, from the 
change at all -- at most, their parameters may respond adaptively to the 
firm's experiences in the marketplace. 
82 I think we can expect more and more approaches to the problem of 
designing open-ended computer programs to emerge from the computer 
science community -- see, for example, Forrest (1990) and Huberman 
(1988). In addition, object-oriented programming, with its emphases on 
modularity and extendability, provides a natural environment for 
building programs of sufficient complexity that they can manifest EHO. 
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processes through which individual agents learn how to act in 
new situations, through the coevolution of new products and 
industrial structure, to the emergence of "herd behavior" in 
markets and macroeconomic metastability. I have also 
described some existing Artificial Worlds that, suitably 
modified or extended, have the potential to give some 
insights into these economic processes. The match between 
problems and methods is not yet very good. The purpose of 
this paper is to promote such a match, by pointing to a 
promising direction for workers with the requisite 
familiarity with economic institutions and behaviors who 
might not have considered this alternative modelling style. 
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